Biography and Society

BIOGRAPHY AND SOCIETY

RESEARCH COMMITTEE 38 OF THE ISA

NEWSLETTER / DECEMBER 2007

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
DECEMBER 2007

Dear Members,

After very exciting and inspiring interim conference of our RC "Biography and Society" Michaela Koettig and I wish to send you our latest newsletter before the end of this year.

The conference "**Ethnicity, Belonging, Biography and Ethnography"** organized by Michaela and me, in cooperation with our colleagues Julia Chaitin and John Linstroth from our TransCoop-Project 'Ethnicity and Biography' and with the Committee of Biographical Research of the German Association of Sociology was attended by around 200 participants from more than 30 nations. They came from Asia, Africa, Australia, the United States and Europe. The 70 lectures, 14 sessions and workshops covered a wide range of topics dealing with the sense of belonging to a socio-cultural collective, ethnicity, migration, transnational biographies, networks and belonging, the management of ethnic conflicts, the politics of belonging, intergenerational transmission and intersectionality. In addition to discussions about theories and methodological issues there were also method workshops on the tools of biographical and ethnographical research.

If you wish there is still the possibility to download our abstract reader or the program of the conference from our website at http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/61023.html.

Regarding the next newsletter we will invite several participants to report about this conference in more detail.

The current newsletter is concentrated on four interesting articles concerning a variety of themes and on empirical work in different continents by members of our RC. We are very pleased to publish these papers in this context and hope you will enjoy reading them.

The paper on inheritance law and practice in an urban context by **Florence Akiiki Asiimwe** is dedicated to a critical consideration of Uganda's laws regarding gender inequality in inheritance rights and the situation of widows who seldom inherit the matrimonial home. Florence presents case studies of "urban widows who under special circumstances were able to inherit the matrimonial home".

Tazuko Kobayashi presents in her paper her empirical work (interviews and participant observation) on the identity and biography of Japanese Americans under the aspect of a 'pilgrimage' for representing collective memory. She shows what the Minidoka (Internment camp site of WWII) Pilgrimage means for Japanese Americans today.

The article by **Julia Vajda** is devoted to an analysis of two interviews with survivors of the Shoah. Julia demonstrates how "being 'listened to' itself" has a healing effect and could be part of a therapeutic process, which enables the narrators to speak about the unspeakable.

Brian Roberts discusses in his paper on "Narrative Analysis and Fantasy in Life" the role fantasy plays in our everyday life and how it is central to our experiences through 'imagination'. He demonstrates how this is implicated in the process of storytelling.

Some further important topics:

We ask all of you to inform us about a consummated change in your address, and in particular your e-mail address**.**

✂ Membership fees

Please remember to pay your membership fee:

Regular members	US$ 40
Students and members from countries B and C (see ISA regulations)	US$ 20

Bank account: Michaela Koettig
Sparda-Bank-Hessen, Germany
bank code: 500 905 00
account number: 101 548 312

For bank transfer of members from European countries
IBAN: 13 500 905 000 101 548 312
BIC: GEN ODE F1 S12

I would like to invite you to reply to this newsletter. We greatly appreciate to get responses to the published articles and would like to publish them in the next issue. As a matter of course you are invited, and asked to feel free, to send us material for the next newsletter.

✂ The deadline for the next newsletter is June 2008

I am delighted to send this newsletter and wish a happy New Year to all of you!

Gabriele Rosenthal
President, Biography and Society, RC38

CONTENTS

NEWS

The Centre for Narrative & Auto / Biographical Studies (NABS) is a new interdisciplinary research centre at the University of Edinburgh. NABS brings together people interested in all aspects of narrative and all forms of auto/biographical representation, from talk to photographs to memorial sites, from verbal introductions to hagiography, from letters to family and friends to memoirs and autobiographies, from obituaries to painted portraits, from academic biography to sculpture, and more. The Centre very much welcomes the diversity of perspectives, theories and methodologies which exist in this broad area of work and is committed to theoretical and methodological openness, rather than being associated with one particular approach.

The Centre has been awarded an ESRC Seminar Series, on 'Narrative Studies in Interdisciplinary Perspective: Theories, Methodologies and Revisions'. These six international and interdisciplinary seminars will run from March 2007 for a two year period and bring together international scholars and PhD researchers working on all aspects of narrative theory and research. The ESRC Narrative Studies seminars will take place on Fridays and the themes and dates are:

- The Narrative Turn: Revisioning Theory – 23 March 2007
- Organisational Practices & Testimonial Narratives of 'Other' Lives – 8 June 2007
- Narrative And The Documents of Life: Everybody's Autobiography? – 7 September 2007
- Space, Place, Time: Body Narratives & Performance – 14 December 2007
- Past, Present & Future: Auto/Biography, National Narratives & Social Change – 14 March 2008
- Narrative Studies to 2020: Modes and Methodologies – 13 June 2008

The NABS Centre is also the base for the Scottish & Northern Narratives Network, which organises regular seminars and workshops on narrative themes. Events during the 2005/6 academic year have included workshops on 'Taking the Narrative Turn?', 'Narrating Our Pasts', and 'Using Narrative Methodologies to Analyse Visual and Written Texts'. Its meeting of 20 October 2006 is on the theme of 'Neglected Narratives and Untold Stories', and more workshops will take place during the 2006/7 academic year in addition to this.

NABS is strongly interdisciplinary and has been established with support from all three Colleges in the University. Its internal Management Group includes people from history, geography, literary studies, nursing, sociology and socio-medical studies. NABS also works in close association with Edinburgh's Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (http://www.iash.ed.ac.uk/index.html) and has organised the IASH Research Theme on 'Life Writing, Testimony and Self-Construction' (http://www.iash.ed.ac.uk/themes.lifewriting.html). Events during the 2005/6 academic year have included seminars on hagiography, writing biography, re-reading David Hume's 'My own Life', and also an afternoon event exploring issues in 18th century biography.

NABS is firmly committed to an international platform, and its International Advisory Board includes people from Australia, Canada, Finland, Iceland, South Africa, Sweden and the USA. The ESRC seminar series (and also IASH's Visiting Fellowships schemes) brings to Edinburgh inter-

national scholars working on research themes connected with biography, autobiography, narrative, testimony and self-construction.

To support its platform of activities, there is a NABS email mailing list. If you would like further information about the ESRC 'Narrative Studies' seminar series or to receive regular email communications about events organised through the NABS Centre, then please contact the Centre by emailing nabs@ed.ac.uk and ask to be placed on the mailing list.

Liz Stanley, Director, NABS, University of Edinburgh

CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENTS

INTERIM CONFERENCE RC 38
FIRST ISA FORUM OF SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC DEBATE

September 5 - 8, 2008, Barcelona, Spain

Main theme□Biographical research and its importance for public policy and debate

Biographical Research has expanded greatly in research practice in the last twenty years. Not only has it developed in terms of methodological and theoretical sophistication it has also been used to study an increasing range of substantive issues and policy areas. The importance of the 'voice' or 'story' of differing groups in society is increasingly recognised not only with academic research but more generally, as an essential part of societal participation.

Session 1: Gender, biography and transnational practices

Joint Session with RC05 Ethnic, Race and Minority Relations**,** Organisers: Helma Lutz and Kathy Davis

This session explores the genderedness of transnational biographies – that is, biographies which involve multiple border-crossings. In the context of globalization, the rise of information and communications technology, and widespread transnational migration and travel, more and more people are engaging in transnational practices in the field of work, parenting and care relationships, consumer culture, and more. We invite papers which explore these transnational life-styles and practices in individuals' biographies with a special focus on the role gender plays in shaping these biographies in specific and sometimes unexpected ways.

Session 2: Biography for society: Health, poverty and social policy

Organiser – Victoria Semenova, Russia

The session is going to discuss the problems of applying biographical data to more wide social context and social policy: how and for what extent it could be useful for practice, for those who work in the spheres of health and social policy; what is its point of view that makes it special kind of social knowledge and what are its advantages and disadvantages in this aspect; and what makes it important social resource for understanding social reality in different countries.

Session 3: Professional identities – Biography and life experience

Organiser – Henning Salling Olesen, University of Roskilde, Denmark.

This session intends to attract papers of a theoretical nature as well as specific empirical work dealing with professional identity of particular groups or in particular situations. The focus should be on the significance of life history contexts for professional learning and identity building, and the interpretation of this by professionals themselves.

Session 4: Biographical approaches and the study of youth

Organiser: Vasintha Veeran, University of Galway and Michaela Koettig, University of Goettingen, Germany□

Youth is a phase of development, which is variously experienced locally, nationally and globally.

It is generally conceived of as a period of "storm and stress". Moreover, it has been identified in the life course of human beings as fraught with dilemmas around identity, and questions about "where do I belong". In addition, much of the debates around youth illustrate dichotomized Western/non western conceptualizations. Evident in this dichotomy is the lack of a significant debate on the presence of ethnicity and cultural factors in the construction of the concept "youth". The complex interplay of culture, social class, language, ethnicity, gender, geographic location etc. is said to impact significantly on this life stage transition. In this session we would like to invite papers focusing on life experiences and constructions of belonging: how youth construct their sense of belonging through, ethnicity, youth movements, political groups and other organizational affiliations. Other lived experiences, which also impact and influence this sense of belonging, include migration, nationalism and social exclusion. This session will focus on a range of factors that contribute to the development of these constructions of belonging and the various manner in which they become embedded and generated in the course of this life stage.

Session 5: Biographical and feminist methods in a global framework

Joint Session with RC32 Women and Society,☐Organisers: Marilyn Porter, Memorial University, Canada, Fatimah Daud, International Islamic University, Malaysia
This joint session (RC38 and RC32) will bring together different perspectives on how feminist thought has influenced biographical methods and vice versa. In particular it will focus on the problems of how theory can sometimes get in the way of understanding how people (women and men) understand their own lives and how they communicate that understanding in biographical interviews.

Session 6: 'Turning points' in biographical theory and analysis

Organiser: Feiwel Kupferberg, Malmo University, Sweden
☐The concept of "turning points" was introduced by Anselm Strauss in☐Mirrors and Masks (1959). This session invites both theoretical papers elaborating explicitly on the concept and empirical papers where the biographical analysis is structured around some type of turning point. The idea is to evaluate the concept by an ongoing dialogue between papers, asking questions such as: 'What does turning points mean in different contexts?' and 'Is it possible/ meaningful to try to make a more general definition?

Session 7: Ethnictiy, race, and minority relations - Transnational identities

Organiser: Lena Inowlocki, University of Frankfurt, Germany and Kathy Davis, Utrecht University, Netherlands☐
In our rapidly globalizing world, societies are characterized by differences and belongings. The multiple belongings of individuals to different collectivities can entail many kinds of ambivalence, strain, and even conflict – for example, the ambivalence of "passing", the suffering from lack of recognition, discrimination and exclusion, and polarized conflicts between majority and minority groups. But hyphenated and transnational belongings of "marginal" men and women to conflicting collectivities can also find an expression in their becoming mediators: interpreters, teachers, or political activists (Stonequist 1937). We invite submissions of biographical analyses of cases with regard to these and related phenomena.

Additional Joint Sessions with other RCs – these are organised by other RCs as part of their

Sessions

Session 8: Biographical research and sociology of art

Joint Session -RC 37 Sociology of Arts/RC38 Biography and Society, Organiser: Felicia Herrschaft, University of Frankfurt, Germany☐

☐Artists use language in a performative way to express their relation to the art world. Artistic processes of creating an artwork can be analyzed through their language use and also through the "working alliance" of researchers with artists. Artists can be seen as opening up a world of action in which they build houses for the visitor, who is no longer someone experiencing a work of art but becomes part of an action. ☐In this session, we propose a substantial and methodological reflection on sociology of art, performative social science, visual sociology, and biographical research, to understand the role of research in the art world. Questions to be raised and discussed can include the following: is the artistic biography changing? What kind of "biographical work" do artists do? How do artists reflect the artistic process of creating an artwork? Does a transnational and cosmopolitan concept of life play a role in the art world and how is it expressed? Are there differences in concepts how artists create artworks and how the curator is involved in the artistic process? Very welcome are papers concerning concepts of art form also in African and Asian countries and different regions of the world.

Programme Coordinators

President: Gabriele Rosenthal, University of Goettingen, Germany, g.rosenthal@gmx.de
Vice-President: Brian Roberts, University of Glamorgan, UK, broberts@glam.ac.uk.
Further information see at:http://www.isa-sociology.org/barcelona_2008/rc/rc38.htm

PUBLICATIONS

Davis, Kathy (2007): The Making of Our Bodies, Ourselves. How Feminism Travels across Borders, Duke University Press

The book Our Bodies, Ourselves is a feminist success story. Selling more than four million copies since its debut in 1970, it has challenged medical dogmas about women's bodies and sexuality, shaped health care policies, energized the reproductive rights movement, and stimulated medical research on women's health. The book has influenced how generations of U.S. women feel about their bodies and health. Our Bodies, Ourselves has also had a whole life outside the United States. It has been taken up, translated, and adapted by women across the globe, inspiring more than thirty foreign language editions.

In this work, Kathy Davis tells the story of the travels of this remarkable book. Based on interviews with members of the Boston Women's Health Book Collective, the group of women who created Our Bodies, Ourselves, as well as responses to the book from readers, and discussions with translators from Latin America, Egypt, Thailand, China, Eastern Europe, Francophone Africa, and many other countries and regions, Davis shows why Our Bodies, Ourselves could never have been so influential if it had been just a popular manual on women's health. It was precisely the book's distinctive epistemology, inviting women to use their own experiences as a resource for producing situated, critical knowledge about their bodies and health, that allowed the book to speak to so many women within and outside the United States. Davis provides a grounded analysis of how feminist knowledge and political practice actually travel, and she shows how the process of transforming Our Bodies, Ourselves offers a glimpse of a truly transnational feminism, one that joins the acknowledgment of difference and diversity among women in different locations with critical reflexivity and political empowerment.

CALL FOR ABSTRACTS

Call: Special Issue of FQS on Performative Social Science

The online qualitative journal, FQS, is pleased to announce a special issue on Performative Social Science to be published in May 2008.

The Call for Abstracts is now live on FQS at http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs/fqs-e/CfP_08-2-e.htm. It is also available in Spanish and German on the site.

Edited by Mary Gergen, Kip Jones, Brian Roberts, Irene Lopez de Vallejo, Peter Wright and John J. Guiney Yallop, the Special Issue hopes to bring thoughtful reflections on and manifestations of Performative Social Science (PSS) to the readership of FQS. The Special Issue will establish a foundational reference for the performative turn in social science.

The special issue welcomes experimental pieces, particularly within the possibilities offered by a web-based journal such as FQS. Any special needs (embedded video, etc.) or contributions that move the issue beyond the normal constraints and layouts of paper-based journals are welcome.

Please see the online Call for Abstracts for more information and how to submit and/or discuss ideas for contributions.

NEW JOURNAL

New Journal "Qualitative Sociology Review" please see at
http://www.qualitativesociologyreview.org/ENG/index_eng.php

Last issue 2006 "Biographical Sociology", see at:
http://www.qualitativesociologyreview.org/ENG/volume3.php

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Davis, Kathy (2007): The Making of Our Bodies, Ourselves. How Feminism Travels across Borders, Duke University Press

Inowlocki, Lena (2006): Stretching It So It Fits Real Well. Biographical, Gendered, and Intergenerational Dimensions of Turning to Religion. In: Geyer, Michael/Hölscher, Lucian (Hg.): Die Gegenwart Gottes in der modernen Gesellschaft, Transzendenz und religiöse Vergemeinschaftung in Deutschland. Göttingen: Wallstein

Inowlocki, Lena/Gültekin, Nevâl/Lutz, Helma (2006): Quest and Query: Interpreting a Biographical Interview with a Turkish Woman Laborer in Germany. In: Historical Social Research, Vol. 31, No. 3

Roberts, Brian (2007): Getting the Most out of the Research Experience: What Every Researcher Needs to Know, Sage

Rosenthal Gabriele (2005): Veiling and Denying The Past: The Dialogue In Families Of Holocaust Survivors And Families Of Nazi Perpetrators. In: Steinert, J.-D. / Weber-Newth, I. (Ed.): Beyond Camps and Forced Labour. Hamburg: Körber, 478-490 – Wiederabdruck von 2002

Rosenthal, Gabriele (2006): The Narrated Life Story: On the Interrelation Between Experience, Memory and Narration. In: Milnes, K., Horrocks, C., Kelly, N., Roberts, B. and Robinson, D. (Eds): Narrative, Memory and Knowledge: Representations, Aesthetics and Contexts. Huddersfield: University of Huddersfield Press, 1 –16

West, L. et al (eds): Using biographical and life history approaches in the study of adult and lifelong learning: perspectives from across Europe. Peter Lang Verlag 2007At 11:49 09-07-2007, you wrote:

Salling Olesen, Henning (2007): Theorising Learning in the Life History: A psycho-societal Approach, In: Studies in the Education of Adults, vol 39, nr., Pgs 38-53

PROJECT ANNOUNCEMENT

Polish migrant sexworkers in the context of sexual economy

M.A. Sociologist/ Cultural Anthropologist Agnieszka Zimowska
contact: aga_z2000@yahoo.de

As point of origin of the PhD project I regard my aim to contribute to a clarification of complex power relations, that had been circulating in the sense of "trafficking in women from Eastern Europe" among academics, journalist, politicians and NGO-members since the last decade. 60% of the German sexbusiness is dominated by migrant sexworkers, half of them form east-middle European member states. From the perspective of migration studies a tendency of severe stigmatising of migrants working in the sexbusiness and a misinterpretation of their living- and working condition as "trafficked women" has been revealed. Jet there is a lack of differentiated knowledge about the power relations migrant sexworkes live and work under, have their agendas and operate.

My empirical project is based on biographical narrative in-depth interviews and participant observation with polish differently aged sexworkers in diverse domains of the German sexbusiness. It deals with their modes of self representation and their understanding of the labour they perform in the light of their biographies. I go into the matter of their ways of and opportunities of operation and decision making against the background of their biographic experiences, situated knowledge and gendered cultural practices. I intend to work out, how sexwork turn on the base of biographical experiences into a socially and culturally based option of migration practices for Polish female nationals in the context of the new EU-membership. I'm not only interested in their individual strategies but in the social structures and discourses that form their self presentations, the relevant power relations in countries of origin and destination. In this context I would like to follow the nexuses of gender, sexuality and ethnicity. The aim is to explore the cultural and political practices of "sexual labour" in the context of migration of polish migrants, instead of trivializing and subsuming them under the term "victims of trafficking".

PAPERS FOR DISKUSSION

Inheritance law and practice in an urban context the new inheritance gender contract

Florence Akiiki Asiimwe
Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda

Note: for a more detailed version of the article please contact Florence: florenceakiiki@yahoo.com/, asiimwe@ss.mak.ac.ug

Abstract

In Uganda married women seldom inherit the matrimonial home whether their husbands die with or with out leaving a Will (testate and intestate) but are usually guaranteed user rights. This chapter presents analysis of urban widows who under special circumstances were able to inherit the matrimonial home. The analysis is part of a wider study conducted among mid-income urban women in Banda and Kiwatule parishes in Kampala Uganda between 2004 and 2006.The chapter critically examines Uganda's inheritance laws in relation to the findings. Through widows life stories the chapter highlights the complexity and contradiction of inheritance statutory laws within which women have to negotiate inheritance rights. The findings show that though inheritance laws do not favour widows to inherit the matrimonial home, and although gender inequality in inheritance rights is evident and still persists, there are special circumstances under which widows can inherit the matrimonial home. The life stories demonstrate that married women were able to inherit the matrimonial when their names were on the title deed either as sole owners or joint owners before their husbands' death. Also, the married women inherited the home when their husbands died before they processed the title deed. Since the Registration of Titles Act gives a right of ownership to individuals or as joint owners, these widows legally owned the homes.

Introduction

"They would not come this way anyway, because they know this is my property"
(A widow's statement, whose home was registered solely in her name before her husband died intestate)

This paper presents the ways in which urban women were able to become homeowners through inheritance. One life story has been chosen to demonstrate the ways in which widows were able to inherit the matrimonial home upon the death of a husband amidst the unfair inheritance laws. In order to understand the dynamics of inheritance and to appreciate the widow's inheritance strategies we focus on both the husbands' and widows' actions during marriage. As Deere and Doss have rightly observed " The inheritance rights of widows are particularly important in marital regimes where women do not have property rights over marital assets, such as in the separation of property regime" (Deere and Doss, 2006) The aim is to identify the various ways in which widows negotiated for their inheritance rights.

International considerations

There is a general belief that in developed countries one of the ways in which women become homeowners is through inheritance. It has also been observed that inheritance is one of the ways in which women accumulate wealth. According to Deere and Doss (2006), wealthy women are more likely than men to have inherited the wealth from either their parents or their husbands. A study in the UK identified inheritance and marriage as the major determinants of women's ownership of property including housing (Deere and Doss, 2006). However, other studies in developed countries also reveal that it is not always true that widows find it easy to inherit the homes in which they lived with their husbands but sometimes instead of benefiting, they often carry with them the poor credit histories of their former spouses (Reitz, 2000) In some cases some of these widows will not have had the opportunity to establish credit in their own names, making them less likely to meet the mortgage obligations. In developed countries widow's inheritance problems can be attributed to the affordability crisis due to rising housing prices and interest rates. These two factors become so crucial in homeownership making it a necessity or a prerequisite to have dual income in order to own housing.

In many developing countries where most societies are patrilineal in nature, a widow seldom inherits the matrimonial home. This is simply because, land and housing is passed on from father to son and women are not usually entitled to inherit the land and home (Deere and Doss, Tusingwire and Tumushabe, 1999). Ownership through inheritance is highly gendered and culturally embedded with complex dynamics. These complex dynamics differ from country to country from society to society, from one ethnic grouping to another. In a situation where women have no right to inherit property, one of the main channels through which they can acquire property is closed (Oguli, 2005, Miraftab 2001). Munalula (1995) also notes while single women might it easier to own a home of their own, widows are unlikely to do so. Studies on widows in Sub-Saharan Africa reveal that in many societies widows do not inherit the matrimonial home. Instead, the matrimonial home belongs to the eldest son of the deceased. If the deceased did not have a boy child, his young brother becomes the heir. Several researchers report that property grabbing in Southern African Countries is the order of the day regardless whether the widow is educated or not. However, studies in Lesotho reveal that customary law is now flexible and as a result widows can now inherit the matrimonial home. In their study in Lesotho, Larsson and Schlyter (1995) found out that the plots of land, which were originally registered in the deceased husbands' names, had been transferred to the widows with no hiccups. Although a few widows had experienced some problems with their relatives, they finally managed to have the plots transferred into their names. These urban widows were able to inherit the plots of land because they got support from the chiefs. What is not clear though is whether these widows were able to develop these plots into homes.

Although in many African societies widows face dispossession, urban widows seem to survive dispossession"[compared to their rural counterparts.] (Larsson 1989).

Studies in Zimbabwe and Lesotho reveal that some urban widows not only had access to their husband's matrimonial home and household property but they also went further to register the matrimonial home in their sole names (Gwaunza et.al 1995, Larsson and Schlyter 1995, Dengu-Zvogbo, 1994). In these cases urban widows were able to transfer the title deed from their husbands' names to their own names not because they had income but simply because of the

support from the state institution. In Lesotho for example the chieftaincy system supports widows' independence because the chiefs control the land. According to Larsson and Schlyter, as a result of urbanisation and labour migration the traditional kinship role is almost none existent. When married women become widows they live independent of their in-laws. In Zambia however, where they have been no legal reforms, all matrimonial property is still regarded as a husband's sole property and hence the issue of a married woman inheriting property does not arise.

In Zimbabwe some widows were able to transfer the matrimonial home in their names due to the support from their in-laws (especially sister and brother-in-laws) and children. For example in cases where the children were grown up and they had their own incomes, they allowed their mother to inherit the matrimonial home even when the inheritance laws support the eldest son of the deceased to inherit the matrimonial home (Gwaunza et.al, 1994)

Studies in Zimbabwe also reveal that the way inheritance matters are handled differs from one ethnic group to another. For example, the urban widows who inherited the matrimonial homes were mainly from Ndebele ethnic group. The findings show that the Ndebele ethnic group are liberal and supportive to widows while the Shona ethnic group are conservative and suppressive to widows (Dengu-Zvogbo et.al, 1994). White and other authors note that ownership of property in matrinilineal and patrilineal societies is largely dependent on the dynamics of the respective societies (White,et.al).

Studies in Uganda however reveal, not only is it impossible for a widow to inherit the matrimonial home but it is also culturally, socially, and politically (legally) unacceptable and impossible for a widow to transfer the matrimonial home into her sole name (Ogulo 2005). In East Africa, a widow culturally, socially, and politically does not inherit the matrimonial home. Instead, the home belongs to the eldest son of the deceased (Asiimwe 2005, Asiimwe 2002, Tamale, 2002).

Against the above background therefore, this chapter presents how urban widows negotiated, the dynamics of inheritance and with what outcomes or consequences. That is, focus is on exploring how inheritance was constantly redefined and negotiated and how the concept of inheritance itself became 'undone' in the process.

This chapter uses experiences of widows to analyze the ways in which the dominant inheritance gender contract was negotiated in practice. This is done in two three main sections. The first section critically examines the institutional legal framework in which urban widows in Uganda operate. The second section analyses how widows became homeowners through inheritance. The third section concludes and makes recommendations.

Statutory laws and Widow's matrimonial home inheritance in Uganda

Although the 1995 Constitution seems to guarantee a widow the right to inherit her late spouse's property it does not specify the type of property the widow is to inherit and hence it is assumed that the matrimonial home is inclusive. Testate Succession seems to be a sure way of the widow to inherit the matrimonial home because a deceased spouse has a right to bequeath the matrimonial home to her but the ground is not all that leveled. Even where the widow has been bequeathed the matrimonial home, which is also rare, she may not easily own the home due to interference by the dependent relatives of the deceased. Notwithstanding the problems,

the widow can be guaranteed ownership rights if she is the beneficiary and the executor. On the other hand, while on the surface intestate succession law seems to give a widow right to inherit property of the deceased, close scrutiny of these intestate rules reveals that the widow does not have ownership rights to the matrimonial home but has only user rights. The matrimonial home belongs to the legal heir who is the eldest son of the deceased. The widow is legally allowed to continue staying in the matrimonial home so long as she keeps it safe and tidy and she does not re-marry. There are laid down conditions under which she can even have the user rights of the matrimonial home. While the right to inherit the matrimonial home seems to be guaranteed under the Constitution, this same right though reflected in the Succession laws does not guarantee a widow ownership rights especially under intestate inheritance. The Constitution itself does not specifically indicate ownership rights of the matrimonial home though under intestate, the succession law is specific on the matrimonial home whereby the eldest son is the owner of the matrimonial home and a widow is a user. The intestate law does not seem to recognize the financial contribution of the widow to the matrimonial home. What makes the intestate law more contentious is that even when the widow had a joint ownership of the matrimonial home with the deceased, it does not seem to allow her to claim the partial ownership rights. The Registration of Titles Act, marriage Act, the Succession Act and the Constitution seem to be contradicting each other.

In summary, there seems to be no sure way through which the widow can inherit the matrimonial home. As noted by some authors, while the 1995 Constitution seems to contain provisions that accord equal treatment and affirmative action to marginalized persons, transmission of these rights through Acts of Parliament has not been forthcoming. Both testate and intestate succession laws are not only in conflict with the Constitution but they discriminate against the widows. As Sebina argues, there are problems of competing ideologies (tradition versus modernity) and these are compounded by the various laws (customary versus statutory) neither of which work to guarantee widows's inheritance rights (Sebina-Zziwa 1998)

Although the Constitutional Court has declared some of clauses in the Succession Act unconstitutional, it is Parliament to approve the changes. It is difficult to tell at this time as to whether Parliament will approve the amendments.

The section following the above discussion on the legal framework examines practical dynamics in inheritance. The section presents the contradicting ways in which some urban widows inherited the matrimonial home thereby demonstrating the new changes in inheritance and how these changes contradict with the existing inheritance laws.

The story of "Beine Scola": Inheritance through sole ownership

Beine is one of the widows who became a homeowner through inheritance upon the death of her husband even when he died intestate. Beine is a retired teacher living with two of her children in a three bed roomed house. The house is iron roofed see fig .1 with electricity and water in the courtyard.

Fig.1: Beine's home in Banda which she solely owned before her husband's death.

Beine, the second born in a family of 15 siblings was born in a middle class family. Her father was a clergyman and managed to educate all his children.

Beine completed eleven years of education in 1960 and thereafter joined Kinyamasika Teacher Training College where she qualified as a grade three- teacher in 1970. She was then posted to Kabwohe Primary School before she joined Kyanyakatura Primary School as a grade three teacher.

In 1976 Baine got married in church to Mwesigye a civil servant working as a principle auditor in the office of Auditor General in Kampala. She then requested for a transfer to Kampala where Mwesigye worked. As a civil servant, Mwesigye was entitled to a government owned house. The family resided in a government owned house in Kololo, one of prime areas in Kampala. The couple was blessed with four children, all girls. While in Kampala Beine taught in many schools for example Nabagereka Primary School, Kololo and Shimoni demonstration school.

While in a government owned house Beine at one time, advised Mwesigye to buy a plot of land in Kampala on which they could build a family home but Mwesigye did not agree to the idea but instead built a home in the rural village. To him building a home in Kampala was unnecessary because he had a spacious government owned house.

As the family continued to stay in a free, spacious government house, Beine saved all her money, because Mwesigye met most of the domestic costs as reflected in her statement. Since her husband had nothing to do with her money she was able to save and decide on what to do with her money.

On failure to convince Mwesigye to buy a plot of land in Kampala, Beine bought a plot of 25 decimals of land in Banda with all her savings and registered it solely in her name, which included both her maiden and husband's name. In her wisdom, when she got married, she did not drop her maiden name; she just added her husband's name to hers. Beine was able to buy a plot of land because she was employed as a teacher with reasonable income and a vision to secure her future. Beine was able to save money and buy a plot of land because Mwesigye met most of the domestic costs. Had she spent her part of her salary on domestic expenses, she would most likely have spent more years saving and this could have delayed her buying a plot of land. Beine informed Mwesigye how she had bought a plot of land in Banda. In the beginning, Mwesigye did not appreciate Beine's action.

Although Beine bought the plot of land, she did not have adequate money to construct a home. On the other hand, Mwesigye as a principal auditor in the office of Auditor General had a higher income. Apart from his salary, he had extra income from the subsistence allowance Government paid him while on travel abroad.

As Mwesigye was approaching retirement age, he realized that he would be asked to vacate the spacious government owned house in Kololo. He neither had land, nor a personal house in Kampala and yet he had four school- going children whose education he did not want to interrupt. He then requested Beine to allow him build a family home on her plot of land, which Beine accepted with no reservation.

Mwesigye's decision to build the family home on Beine's plot of land was most likely because he realized that he did not have enough money to buy a plot of land and build home at the same time. He could not imagine renting a two-roomed house either having lived in a spacious government owned house. Had Mwesigye been too proud to build a home on Beine's land, Beine would most likely not have owned a home. Instead, she could have ended up with only a plot of land because she did not have money to develop it. Similarly, had Beine not bought the land and registered it in her name, she would have nothing to offer to Mwesigye at the critical moment when he needed substantial help. Mwesigye's decision to build a family home on Beine's land was a blessing to Beine. Mwesigye met all the construction costs of the home. Although Mwesigye built the home, legally the home belongs to Beine. This is simply because the title deed of the plot is solely registered in Beine's name.

When Mwesigye retired, the family moved from the government owned house in Kololo to their own home in Banda. Although Mwesigye built the home on Beine's plot of land, he seemed not happy that the title deed of the plot of land on which he built the home was registered solely in Beine's name. At one time, he suggested to Beine to change the title deed to joint ownership.

In 2003, Mwesigye became critically ill. In his last days, he requested Beine that he should not be buried in the rural village but in the compound of his home.

Mwesigye's request to be buried in Kampala demonstrated the male cultural image ideology that a home belongs to the man not a woman alone.

When Mwesigye died in 2004, he was buried in the courtyard of the home as he had wished. This act took many of the family friends by surprise. Hence, Mwesigye's request to be buried in Kampala was a shock to his friends whom this researcher talked to. According to Kinyankole

culture where Mwesigye was born, burial of heads of households is usually in the rural village. One of the respondents confided to the researcher that by the time his friend and neighbor Mwesigye died, he was in the rural village. Knowing that automatically Mwesigye's body would be transported to the rural village he cancelled his plans to join the family in Kampala and instead waited at the rural home. He was later shocked to learn that Mwesigye was to be buried in Kampala. Although Tumwine tries to justify Mwesigye's burial wishes she would most likely find it difficult to sell or mortgage the home even if she legally owns it. Mwesigye's wish to be buried in Kampala remains a mystery.

When Mwesigye died, Beine did not experience any conflict with her in-laws as reflected in her words. **"They would not come this way anyway, because they know this is my property".**

In Beine's case there was no legal way that anyone could take or claim the home because the home was legally hers already. Even if Mwesigye had contested ownership if he were alive, he would most likely have lost the case. This is because he would have to produce evidence that he constructed the home. Therefore upon Mwesigye's demise any contestant would most likely find it damn difficult to legally to claim the home.

Although Mwesigye met all the construction costs of the home, Baine legally owns the home because the title deed of the plot of land on which the home is built is registered solely in her name. Hence upon Mwesigye's death, Beine automatically inherited the home because the land on which the home was built legally belonged to her. Had Mwesigye not constructed the home, Beine would most likely not have been able to finance the constructed. She would most likely have ended up with an undeveloped plot of land with no home. After the burial, Beine processed letters of administration. She took to the administrator general a letter of consent from her children and a marriage certificate. She explained to the Administrator general that all her brother in-laws had died and her sister in-laws had all got married and therefore she could not obtain a family letter as is required by the inheritance law. Since Beine had a marriage certificate she convinced the Administrator General to obtain a letter of no objection, which she took to the High court to obtain letters of administration. Beine needed the letters of administrative purposely to obtain her husband's death gratuity nothing else

With the letters of administration she was able to obtain the pension and death gratuity. She used part of the money to install plumbing and sanitary provisions in the home.

Although the intestate succession law makes it clear that the matrimonial home includes the home and the land on which it is built, the law fails to account for cases where the land is registered in the widow's name. In Beine's case, the intestate law is irrelevant because the land and the home are registered in her name. According to the Registration of Titles Act, the proprietor, whose name appears on the title deed, has the legal right to transact any business on the said property. Since the Registration of Titles Act does not differentiate between the landowner and homeowner, the Beine inherited the home.

In conclusion, Beine was able to inherit the matrimonial home because the plot of land on which her husband built the matrimonial home was already registered solely in her name. Although her husband met all the construction costs of the home, the home legally belongs to her

and therefore the intestate succession laws is redundant in this case. There is no legal way that anyone could claim inheritance rights because the home was legally hers already.

The above story demonstrates that the marital regime determines the inheritance regime. In a case where the matrimonial is solely owned before the husband's death, the same gender contract will be reflected at inheritance.

Conclusion

The paper presents evidence to show that inheritance laws can be challenged and sometimes manipulated in practice. This is because inheritance law and Registration of Title Act contradict each other. There is need to harmonize the different family laws. In the meantime the married women can utilize the Registration of Titles Act to have their names on the title deed on which the matrimonial home is built. In so doing they would be able to exercise inheritance rights upon the death of their husbands.

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"Pilgrimage" for representing Collective Memory: Identity and Biographies of Japanese Americans

Tazuko Kobayashi
Japan Women's University

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Minidoka Pilgrimage 2003

In June 2003, the Japanese-American community of Seattle organized its first bus trip to visit the Minidoka Internment camp site of World War II. Minidoka was constructed in the wasteland of southern Idaho as one of ten internment camps where about 120,000 Japanese Americans were incarcerated after President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942. By September 1942, an approximate total number of 13,000 Japanese Americans of Washington and Oregon states were transferred from the temporary relocation centers and for three years, until autumn 1945, forced to live in Minidoka. By the end of 1945, the site was closed and auctioned off, then converted into fields and meadows, and now some 60 years have passed.

Minidoka was a huge internment camp with hundreds of barracks and surrounded with barbed wire. The geographical location was the same, but now, all that was left was a small pile of stones, traces of where once a gate and a watchtower had stood. Although nothing remained of the camp site, it was still a place where the Japanese Americans who participated in the pilgrimage were able to recall personal memories, and at the same time it was a place that represented collective memory.

Based on my participant observation of Minidoka Pilgrimage and three interviews I conducted of Japanese Sansei (third generation) and Yonsei (fourth generation), I will discuss what Minidoka Pilgrimage represents for Japanese Americans today and what meaning the pilgrimage gave to young Japanese Americans.

Pilgrimage from the viewpoint of 'realms of memory' (lieux de mémoire)

Realms of memory

I was inspired by the concept of 'realms of memory' (lieux de mémoire) in studying the pilgrimage made by the Japanese Americans.

Pierre Nora defines 'realms of memory' as "any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community" [1996:xvii]. With this concept, it is possible to think about collective memory of a community. As "memory is always a phenomenon of the present" and "memory is life, always embodied in living societies" [1996:3], 'realms of memory' is something that has to do with "the presence of the past" [1996:16]. Nora points out that "living societies" express the presence of memory and its relationship with the community.

The creation of 'realms of memory' for a minority could have been difficult for the pilgrimage in Japanese community. Nora says that "realms of memory arise out of a sense that there is no such thing as spontaneous memory, hence that we must create archives, mark anniversaries,

organize celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and authenticate documents because such things no longer happen as a matter of course" [1996:7], and community, especially "minorities create protected enclaves as preserves of memory to be jealously safeguarded," because, "without commemorative vigilance, history would soon sweep them away" [1996:7]. This view offers a clue for understanding the pilgrimage.

Through "realms of memory" as described by Nora, the Minidoka pilgrimage becomes symbolic of the collective memory of the current Japanese-American community of Seattle and its incarceration during World War II. At a time when World War II has passed its sixtieth anniversary and the redress of 1988 will soon mark its twentieth year, the pilgrimage teaches us how memory of the past is managed, and as the number of Japanese Americans with internment experience decreases steadily, we see how their "memorial heritage" is created and left for posterity.

Minidoka as a sacred place

A visit to a sacred place is a pilgrimage, not a trip to revisit an internment camp after sixty years. The term 'pilgrimage' was taken from pilgrimage tours made to other internment camp sites like Manzaner and Tulelake.

Actually, Minidoka is becoming a 'sacred place' symbolizing the suffering endured by the Japanese Issei and Nisei who spent three years there in compulsory internment , and also a place symbolizing racial discrimination and human rights violation in the United States. A small plate on which the history of Minidoka is engraved is located on the remains of the watchtower gate. Minidoka was declared a national monument in 2001 by the former president Bill Clinton, thus acknowledging Minidoka as a place of racial discrimination endorsed the nation before the war.

Nora lists 'the cult of the dead' as one of the categories of 'realms of memory'. The highlight of the events performed during the pilgrimage was the ceremony to mourn the dead. A veteran read the names of the Nisei from Minidoka who had volunteered as members of the 442nd combat corps and were killed in action on the European front. The silent prayer and flowers offered by the pilgrims were symbolic of the suffering and loyalty of the community.

Remembering and reconfirmation

About one-third of the pilgrims was the Nisei who had experienced time at Minidoka. For most of them, this was the first opportunity to visit the camp site since liberation sixty years ago.

In the bus to Minidoka, tags with family numbers were distributed, similar to ones that the internees were made to wear when they were transferred in 1942. The pilgrimas walked around the site at Minidoka wearing their tags. While remembering that there was no green at that time, they looked around the blocks where they had spent their childhood with their families. Distant memories of a painful past were reawakened. The pilgrimage was an emotional time of remembrance and reconfirmation for each individual.

Transmission and sharing

The Issei, the first generation who experienced Minidoka, have already passed away, and most Nisei are gradually decreasing in number. Those who experienced internment believe they

should convey their memories of those difficult days to the next generation. Participating in the pilgrimage in itself functioned as a transmission of that experience to the next generation.

The most remarkable characteristic of Minidoka Pilgrimage is that it became a place for storytelling. The pilgrimage became an opportunity to transmit and share experiences orally. Storytelling time was arranged on the second night. All participants introduced themselves and recalled their memories of the camp and how they felt visiting Minidoka again. A number of stories with strong emotions were shared.

The pilgrimage included many more Sansei, Yonsei and others without actual camp experience than the Nisei internees who could speak about their Minidoka experience. After hearing the stories, those with no camp experience were able to understand that the internment site they had visited during the day was the exact place where the Nisei lived sixty years ago.

Sympathy and communion

Storytelling time took place again on the bus home. There was a highly charged and emotional space among the pilgrims who had just completed their visit to a sacred place. On the bus running a straight road on a great plain, monotonous scenery from the car window, on the long 12-hour journey to Seattle, the growing intimacy after three intense days together may have prompted the storytelling.

The space filled with stories became, so to speak, a community of narratives. The telling of stories was encouraged, and sympathy was expressed. Told stories expressed the lived experience of Minidoka. Through these stories, narrators and listeners shared a sacred communion together as they felt a sympathy born in the space filled with stories.

Storytelling and collective memory

These narratives of lived experience show that Minidoka Pilgrimage as 'lieux de mémoire' is supported by 'living memories.' These 'living memories' were individual memories of Minidoka that had not yet been told enough or that internees had not wanted to tell. The existence of people living with such individual memories became apparent. But with the aging and passing of people who have stories to tell, 'living memory' is in danger of disappearing without being told. Therefore, every opportunity was sought for individual memories to be recalled and reaffirmed, and to share and transmit by. Told stories must be taken in as collective memory in an environment of communion, where there is sympathy and understanding for the stories.

Biographies and identities of part Japanese Americans

The biographies in this paper are told by young Japanese Americans who organized the pilgrimage and took part in creating 'realms of memory'. Three of those whom I interviewed were: Anna, engaged in Minidoka Internment National Monument project; Emily chair of Pilgrimage Committee in JACL (Japanese American Citizen League) Seattle; and Tatsuo, president of JACL Seattle.

The reason these three people were selected is that they were young Sansei or Yonsei, born in the 1970s. As a matter of course, none of them had direct experience of the Minidoka internment. However, because their parental generation and grandparents' generation did not tell it

to them about the internment experience, they were not able to succeed to the internment experience story. The three young interviewees were part Japanese, with one non-Japanese parent was. In seeking their identities they chose to consider themselves as ethnically Japanese American. Their motives for Minidoka Pilgrimage were formed as they sought to establish their identities. They needed the opportunity to participate in collective memory and therefore became actively engaged in organizing the pilgrimage.

The story of Anna

Anna works as a landscape architect in National Park Service which is carrying out the Minidoka Internment National Project. At Minidoka, she explained the geographical placement of the camp site to the pilgrims.

Anna is a Sansei in her thirties, born on the East Coast. Among ancestors on her mother's side who had immigrated in the 1920s were her great-grandparents, grandparents, her mother and her mother's siblings. But Anna herself grew up without any relationship with the Japanese community because her mother had put distance between herself and the Japanese community and Anna's father was Caucasian.

Anna was not interested in Japanese-American history and culture until three years ago. She drove a car and arrived at Minidoka by herself, guided by a map, knowing just the name of Minidoka. She expressed her initial interest and motivation in learning about Minidoka as follows: "It seemed to me there was something missing, I wanted to find it there". She had not heard any family member speak about Minidoka. By then, her grandparents had passed away, and she wanted to find what was missing. Though her great-grandparents, grandparents, uncles and aunts of her mother's side, and her mother, so many family members and relatives had had internment experience at Minidoka, nobody had told her, and she did not know anything. Just three years ago, she began to feel that there was a family story not yet told and that something was missing.

She also explained her interest in Minidoka in terms of civil rights and racism reflected her family background.

Anna compiled her M.A. thesis on a study of a garden in the internment camp and is now working at the Japanese-American Project of National Park Service as landscape architect, planning a monument and carrying out interview as part of the planning work.

During the three years that she has been engaged in the project, she thinks that she has changed. Besides her identity as an American, she began to have a Japanese-American identity as well. She discovered herself as a Japanese-American, and her Japanese American identity was further reinforced in her relationship with the Japanese community.

The story of Emily

Emily was one of the organizers of the Minidoka Pilgrimage. She was responsible for with setting up the committee, arranging the tour, and communicating with other branch offices, and played a central role in carrying out the pilgrimage.

Emily is a photographer in her thirties who grew up in the Seattle suburbs. Since she was child, she was brought up among the Japanese-American families on her father's side. But her grandmother, who was an internee, hardly told anyone about Minidoka.

Emily participated in the pilgrimages to TuleLake and Manzaner on her own and was aware of the movement to participate in pilgrimages. She became active since attending a JACL board meeting.

Emily says that Minidoka meant "being American" for her. "Minidoka for me is about being American. I am Japanese American, but the camp itself was not about cultural Japanese heritage. To me, it is about what to be American. As a young person today, I need to ask the question to myself. There are a lot of things to be worked out to make sure Minidoka never happens again. So, to me, I guess it is about respecting myself and respecting the ideals of the constitution and civil rights that were founded on a general principle. That is being American, though everyone did it his or her own way, and some people said no. But Minidoka is like this for me." She also said that Minidoka was a matter of her own identity in American society.

The story of Tatsuo

Tatsuo is young community activist in his twenties who was elected president of JACL's Seattle branch. He participated in the pilgrimage and gave a speech at the ceremony there as a representative of JACL Seattle.

Tatsuo is Sansei and grew up in the Mid-West. His father was Japanese American and his mother German American. His physical features were Japanese, and he grew up with a lot of discrimination in the Mid-West where there were few Asian people. He chose to enter a university in Seattle, and after graduation, he worked in a social welfare organization in the Japanese-American community. It was his childhood experience of that brought him to Seattle and developed his interest in the Japanese American community there.

In the Mid-West of the 1980s, Tatsuo's visibly different appearance was the cause of much discrimination. The experience became the basis for him to think about civil rights.

As for what he learned about internment when he was a high school student, only two pages in a textbook referred to it, and a teacher talked about 'relocation.' At home, his older brother told him about a book, Obasan, by Joy Kogawa, which described a Japanese-Canadian experience. He read the book and learned about the internment experience, but his father had never told him about it.

Tatsuo is a social worker for the Japanese-American community now. He said that thinking about what the leaders of the community accomplished in the seeking redress and establishing the organization has made him proud of being Japanese-American.

From the three biographies

From the three biographies, I can see a number of common denominators among these young people who sought to relate to the "realms of memory" in the form of pilgrimage as collective memory. They had no internment experience. They are part Japanese American with one non-Japanese parent, and after coming of age they asked themselves their identity and chose to be Japanese American. They experienced discrimination as children. They grew up with little or no

relation with the Japanese community and did not succeed to Japanese-American culture or the collective memory of the families of the Japanese-American community. Especially, they were not able to learn from the older generation even if there had been a family with actual internment experience.

Outside their families and in Japanese community, they sought to learn the story that was not conveyed by their own families. They recognized the importance of how the memory of Minidoka must be kept as collective memory of the Japanese community. They also discussed the meaning of Minidoka as a problem of American society in terms of civil rights and racism. This is why they organized the pilgrimage for the community. And the pilgrimage affected them personally by reinforcing their identities as Japanese Americans.

Life Stories and collective memory'

The pilgrimage was a place where many stories were told and overlapped. Based on two kinds of oral stories--one being the three life stories of my interviewees and the other being the stories that I heard on the pilgrimage--I thought about Minidoka Pilgrimage as 'realms of memory'. I observed a characteristic of the pilgrimage as 'realms of memory' and what kinds of people tried to build 'realms of memory.' From the three life stories, two points become clear regarding the people with no internment experience who were seeking to create a 'realm of memory.'

One point is how people with no internment experience were told. In their stories, the three interviewees tried to understand their parents' and grandparents' experiences in particular. They learned about what the older generation in their families had been through, and related this to their own identities. In Collective Memory, Maurice Halbwachs mentions, for example, that a family story before one is born can be incorporated into one's identity, and told as a part of one's life story. By talking within a family, we can share collective memory without having any direct experience and can thus succeed to a family story. But when there is a story that cannot be inherited within a family, and when the story that was not told within a family is a story of the community to which a family belongs, the community outside the family is asked to share such the story. The lack of a story of internment experience among families motivates the younger generation to create 'realms of memory' in the Japanese-American community.

The other point is the issue of a person with "indirect" experience joining collective memory. In Collective Memory Halbwachs writes that even if a person with direct experience forgets his or her individual memory, it can be recalled by re-collectivization. Therefore, individual memory can assume collective memory as an external place to keep memory. But, according to Halbwachs, without individual memory we can contribute to recollecting and maintaining collective memory by participating in a group. Those who have no individual memory, no direct experience, can be part of collective memory. Without any individual memory of Minidoka, it is possible to share collective memory by participating in the Japanese-American community. Therefore, 'realms of memory' which were created by people without direct experience provided an opportunity to share collective memory and incorporate it in one's in personal story.

The aging and passing of internees and the increase of part Japanese citizens have brought about a sense of impending crisis threatening 'living memory.' The situation allows them to create 'realms of memory.' The memory of internment was memory that the internees wanted to

forget, not remember and not tell, so they shut it into their individual memories. That is how 'living memory' has been maintained. But the decrease in persons with direct experience and increase of part Japanese present a crisis for the 'living memory' of internment. This is why the pilgrimage was organized and created 'realms of memory' to represent collective memory. Those who have no direct experience played a central role in creating 'realms of memory' of Minidoka.

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„I am not over it yet!" – Two cases illustrating the therapeutic effect of the biographical narrative interview technique

Julia Vajda
ELTE University, Hungary

The narrative interview technique, despite of the efforts of some of us, has not found its real way into Hungarian sociology yet. However, there are already countries, where the fight of colleagues for the right place of the method was already successful. Still, their battle was also hard. The technique, where the sociologist does not ask specific questions as the one, who knows what the decisive factors are, has been viewed with a certain aversion, least because it questions the self-definition of sociology as an objective discipline but for its interviewing and analysis techniques resemble the techniques and perspective of psychology and psychoanalysis – at least in my understanding. In his discussion of the rejection of psychoanalysis, Rorty emphasises that one can find it hard to accept the image of man offered by psychoanalysis: „the ego is not the master of its own house", and that by saying so Freud wounded man's narcissism[1].

The problem with the narrative interview technique and its hermeneutic analysis seems to be a similar case. At least in as much as it puts the emphasis on and focuses on the individual, arguing that the individual can, in fact should be the subject of sociological research, for at least two reasons. At first, the working of society is the resultant of the working and behaviour of individuals and what is much more important, the individual story, as there is no "general or aver-

[1] C.f. Gábor Katona, Modern pragmatizmus és pszichoanalízis, Rorty ironikus esztétája az analitikus díványán (Modern pragmatism and Psychoanalysis. Rorty's ironic aesthetician on the analyst's couch), in: Thalassa, Pszichoanalízis és posztmodern, 1997/1

age individual", gives such a deep insight into societal processes, nothing else does.[2] However, understanding the individual story requires also the understanding of the individual as a real person, accepting him or her not being a "homo rationalis", but a human being with a psyche, that among other factors also influences his/her deeds. And above that, understanding the other involves accepting the individual on the other side as well, as the one who interprets and whose subjectivity is unavoidably not just present in his/her understanding but also a mean for it. And this is a double threat for those, who would like to reckon sociology a science just as "objective" science, as natural sciences are and above that would like to see man, or at least themselves as truly rational.

However, the aim of the Hungarian original of this paper was to convince sociologists in my country that this technique is not just an appropriate and useful mean for understanding our society, but it also has other advantages. It can also help people to cope with both, the painful past and the difficult present. It can even launch a process of heeling the traumas past has left behind.

Nevertheless, the similarity of the two, interview and psychoanalysis and psychotherapy is only partial, especially if what we are doing is not interpreting a case – be it therapy or interview - sitting at our desk but are listening to someone in the non-therapy situation, we are together with someone who has not asked for being listened to, but we have asked him/her to tell us his/her story and he/she was so kind to allow it to us and accepted our request. We should not forget about it even if we might almost be sure that behind this acceptance was the wish to talk also present and even if we are convinced that our way of interviewing is not harmful if we use it consequently, as in this case it does not provide interpretations that can hurt.

It is surely superfluous to explain this technique in this periodical.[3] However, from the point of view of what I intend to present, it is important to stress that with this technique the emphasis is on the life story of the interviewee as a narrator. The analysis involves both the content and structure and linguistic characteristics of the narration. In this interviewing technique, the formulation and structuring of the narration as well as the selection of pieces of information is left to the interviewee that provides the possibility for the interpreter of differentiating between the interviewee's and its own understanding, i.e. between the story told by the narrator and the history lived by him/her – or simply between the narrated life story and experienced life history and makes it possible to interpret their relationship. However, while interpreting the text from this two different points of views trying to reconstruct the story our interviewee lives with, i.e. his/her narrative identity in the term for Ricoeur and the one we can reconstruct what someone looking at the story from outside can see reconstructing the story from the biographic information given by the narrator, that the interview, the actual narration be our influence ever so little is a product of a joint effort of the two, interviewer and interviewee.

[2] Excellently discussed by Sebastian Haffner in his book Defying Hitler (HAFFNER, 2002), explaining why his personal story in Germany in the 1930s is important to understand the period as a whole.

[3] If still would be a need for it, the reader should forgive if I do not cite the already huge literature on the method, but just refer to Fritz Schütze and Gabriele Rosenthal, whose bibliography contain plenty of books and articles on both, the method of interview and analysis and also its uses in resarch and refers to also further others.

The emphasis is on the text production: on what and how the narrator tells the interviewer when first asked to tell his/her life story. In order to let the narrator create his/her text, unavoidably influenced by the interviewer to some extent, and then to be able to interpret this influence in the course of the analysis, interruption by the interviewer must be minimized. This requires the interviewer to fully withdraw after he/she has built up the interview situation and has asked the interviewee to narrate his/her story from a certain perspective. The interviewer must behave in a way which is unusual in everyday life: he/she must not comment on what he/she heard, must not ask questions based on what he/she thinks about what he/she heard.

Nevertheless, if we manage to be present as the perfect un-interrupting and un-commenting audience, we get a text, which is though undeniably a kind of interactive product, but the influence of the „invisible" interviewer and his/her questions is transparent and interpretable.

These frames, however, produce another effect on both the situation and the interviewee. People interviewed with this technique first may be reluctant to narrate and find this strange, unusual situation hard to accept, but then come to like it. They are fascinated by what first interviews in psychotherapy offer too[4:] that they can narrate freely to someone who is not part of their everyday life, whom they will not meet next day knowing what was said between them the day before.

And this experience, topped with the listener's devoted full attention is so liberating that most of our interviewees open up in a minute or two and tell their stories in such depth which is only usual in therapeutic sessions rather than in an every day situation. This liberating experience is then enhanced by the next step. Again, the primary objective is to ensure that the text to be analysed is produced by the interviewee. When the interviewee has finished his/her narration, the interviewer must ask only questions that relate to what has been told, and must make sure that questions are asked about everything what has been told. All questions should be made in an un-interpreting way, only requesting the elaboration or the details of an event.

By prompting the interviewee to go on telling about his/her life, including potentially unimportant feelings and events (psychotherapists know that the most important suppressed experiences and feelings, especially those which the narrator wishes to think unimportant, hide here), but not commenting on what has been heard, the interviewer gives the narrator the possibility to immerse in his/her own experiences without seducing him/her in a therapy like interaction that would require continuation.

Questions not bearing a interpretative character give the narrator the possibility to dig deep down in his/her own feelings but at the same time is not forced to „understand" what he/she has told and may maintain defence and suppression. Questions including the comments and interpretation of the interviewer would deprive the interviewee exactly of this possibility; such questions may make the narrator face something he/she is not prepared yet to face.

[4] Argelander, Hermann (1992). Das Erstinterview in der Psychotherapie. Erträge der Forschung [The First Interview in Psychotherapy. Research Results]. Bd. 2. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Here I do not wish to theorize on why and how this interview technique has a therapeutic effect (not the least because Gabriele Rosenthal fully explored this effect in her paper[5] but to illustrate it not just to the sceptical Hungarian but also to the more recipient readers through the partial analysis of two cases.

Psychotherapists often ask themselves and the profession what the real agent in therapy is. These interviews suggest that on many occasions simply listening is enough – being „listened to" itself has the power of cure.

* * *

I have already written about Márta, an elderly lady, in several papers 6. She was the first person to be interviewed in the frames of a research project focussing on the Shoah and Shoah victims.

She had been interviewed about this topic earlier, too. Eighty year-old Márta was of the opinion that she and the others, who had gone through Shoah should not take their stories in their graves and when asked she immediately agreed to be interviewed. Yet she was afraid of it. A previous interview had upset her very much, so she made it a condition that I could go to her only once. The interview lasted nearly five hours, during which – in the interviewing manner described above – mostly Márta spoke. Since I knew I could not go back and I was worried about how long she – and I – can go at that single session, I asked even fewer questions than usual. Nonetheless, the story finely developed. Apart from learning about the many horrors, I came to understand that Márta suffers not purely, and maybe not primarily, of these horrors and her memories of them: since 1945 she has been carrying the burden her 15-year old sister inflicted on her when she was separated from Márta and sent to the gas chamber at a sign by Mengele.

It happened while in the Auschwitz camp that a woman in Márta's barrack delivered a baby, but it was not allowed even the time to cry out. Womanly hands nature created to caress a baby, choked it to death instead because the women thought that a world like theirs would have spared neither the baby nor themselves if the newborn had been discovered. And it was 17-year old Márta who had to take the baby's body in the waste bin out to the latrine so that the rest of them could be safe.

Until her last breath Márta thought – and she may have been right, though it makes no difference – that when separated, her sister did not wave her goodbye but beckoned her to come, wanted Márta with herself in death. As an experienced camp-inmate, she obviously knew what was ahead. We naturally forgive the sister's guilt and fear, but 17-year old Márta could not forgive, maybe it was not possible for her. She could not know how much more time she was to have when she was sent to a different queue by Mengele, but she could not bring herself to follow her sister. She could not bring herself to throw away her young life.

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[5] Rosenthal, Gabriele (2003): The Healing Effects of Storytelling. On the Conditions of Curative Story-telling in the Context of Research and Counselling. In: Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 9 (6), 915-933

[6] With co-author Éva Kovács: Abused Past - Forced Future, in: Transversal, 2004, Magunkra hagyva – egy interjú története (Loneliness – the story of an interview), in: Esztertáska, szerk. Pécsi Katalin, megjelenés alatt angolul és magyarul, Budapest, 2004 és Ex-Symposion 2004/3-4, The Therapeutic Effect as Side Product, in: Journal of Social Work Practice, under publication

And later the two stories blended. I understood it only when analysing the narrative, not at the time of interview. At the moment of separation Márta probably could not forgive her sister. But later, when she had no conscious knowledge of this, she could not forgive herself, again unconsciously, for not forgiving her sister. And this anger with her sister and not forgiving her later on became Márta's – again unconscious – main guilt, which together with being an accomplice in killing the baby put the guilt of double murder on her. Eighty year-old Márta put this way what had happened sixty years before: „I am the murderer of my sister."

In the light of this it may be no wonder that Márta, sterilised in Auschwitz and having lost practically her whole family, was never able to share the experience of the humiliating sterilisation with her husband and partners. This, together with the burden of the imaginary child-murders, made her incapable of raising someone else's child. She died lonely, feeling forsaken by the world.

Two weeks after the interview she called me. And asked me to continue to work with this „technology". Because, as opposed to earlier interviews, this approach allowed her to tell her story without being interrupted and disturbed by questions.[7] When talking to her on the phone I failed to fully assess the importance of what she said: that the interview was the first time she was relieved **since then**.

Of course it may well be an exaggeration, but there is something to it. Namely that what Márta experienced this time, in contrast to the previous interviews, was that she was not upset, but that talking about it reduced her burden of sixty years. It relieved her.

Now let us see another story. Magda, a Shoah victim too, is a few years younger than Márta.

> „- Could we go back a little to your husband? You mentioned that in the Szebenyi trial he was put in jail, and you
>
> - That one was another husband. That was terr-, I couldn't get over it yet./ I could not get over it. ((speaking by syllables)) I cannot, I cannot express my opinion. Simply, I am not over it yet! (5)"

What other husband? We have been together with Mrs Berkes, Magda, for hours. In response to our request to tell us her life story she has been talking for two hours. Our question about the husband referred to something she said but did not elaborate before. In her narration, detailed as it was, she never mentioned that she had had two husbands. Although she seemed to have told „everything". She was born in 1926 in Szeged to an upper-middle class Jewish mother and a poor Jewish father, both coming originally from Transylvania. She had a Jewish governess from Vienna, and in addition to German, as a child she learned to speak English and French as fluently as her mother tongue. She went to a Lutheran primary school, then to a secondary school run by nuns. Despite being a Jew, the school let her take the final exams. In June 1944, right after her final exam the whole family is deported to Auschwitz, where all except for her are immediately sent to the gas chamber.

[7] The previous interview was a structured one, where Márta had to answer pre-formulated questions that did not reflect directly on her story.

She was sent to work in a chemicals factory, where she could bathe daily and was given a little more food. Liberated, after a few months she went home to stay with her only living relative in Transylvania.

Coming home to Hungary after two years, she immediately marries and joins the Communist Party. After 1956 she does not re-join the Party, and goes to work at a foreign trade company, from where she travels a lot.

This was the story first told. When asked about something she mentioned, i.e. she lived in historical times, she once again lists the losses, Shoah, the persons she lost there. And then, in general terms, she says that she became disillusioned with the Party because of the show trials and relocations in the '50s. She also makes a small remark about her husband being imprisoned in the Szebenyi trial, a side trial of the Rajk case, and she herself was sent to the town of Komló as unskilled labour.

This is what we ask about when this other husband comes up to our greatest astonishment. How come she never told about him? It is incomprehensible for she spoke about her husband's family lovingly. It sounded like she had had perfect harmonious relationship with that family.

What skeleton has she in the cupboard? Is there something here Magda is reluctant to talk about, something she is defending? And why were those years so terrible that she cannot talk about them today? Was she abandoned by her family, by her friends? Or was being made an unskilled worker so humiliating? That after the forced labour in the Nazi camp, she has to do physical work again? Or is there something even more horrible that inhibits her? Is it related to her divorce? Or are her divorce and the imprisonment connected? After a long pause she continues:

> „- I don't want to talk about it right now. ((sighs))

- Yes, of course", the interviewer naturally agrees. And we can just try guessing what was so horrible that Magda cannot share with us, she, who talked with admirable plasticity and in detail about her Nazi camp experiences.

> „- You said you became an unskilled worker. Could you perhaps talk about this one?
>
> -/Of course, about that I can. Under socialism, you know, it was like-was like ll-((sighs)) (3) this certain falling from grace, and these self-blaming trials and*, you know. I don't remember whose witty remark it was that when the Soviet Union or=or only its Communist Party wiped out all its enemies, and because it continuously needed enemies, then it started=searching=the enemy within itself. That –th er this is a bon mot but there is a lot of truth in this bon mot,"

And she explains at considerable length what the regime was like, what the conditions were like back then, what the show trials were like, and does not go over to her personal story for a good while. Then

> „something like that happened to my first husband that *he fell from grace; and- and that was only one fact which contributed to my realising what the practice of socialism in reality is, because fate was so good to me, you know, the clever learns from the mistakes of others, but no:, I had to go through it on my own"

She seems to keep avoiding telling her own story. As we have already suspected there is something very hard for her to tell.

> „so what happened was that I=then=was head of the sub-department=of education in county **Borsod**, and my husband was imprisoned, they of course did not=tell=why, and I was fired from my job and put out of my flat within a day, * I was fired from everywhere, and I=found=myself=there again by myself."

She starts her own story. The part about being fired from her job and moved out of her flat rhymes with her Shoah experience, even though she herself could go to a secondary grammar school where she was not hurt.

> „I must add that the family of my husband supported me by all means and wanted to help me. I did not accept because I always wanted to be able to **look after** myself,"

Why does Magda tell this? Why did not she accept help? Earlier she said about her mother-in-law that when in 1947 she met her husband „I called her mummy-mummy and I called her mummy-mummy because she was doubly my mother. On the one hand, you see, by the right that she was my mother-in-law and on the other hand because she wanted very much to be a substitute of my own mother"

Why does not she want to accept mummy-mummy's help? Did their relationship get worse? But then why do they want to help? And why does Magda, right after this quotation, say, „I don't like to talk abo-, about the periods of my life after that."

Let us see how she continues her story about being an unskilled worker:

> „that's how I became an unskilled worker at Komló./ I was loading and pushing the bogie in the mine. ((ironically)). And life is humorous and joking=you see, because I was pushing the bogies in Komló. In the quality of=unskilled worker"

This must have been hard physically, too and Magda, surviving and coming home from the Shoah, speaking two foreign languages fluently and two more reasonably well, was not prepared for that. As if this situation evoked the Shoah, but she is ironical about it and talks about life's jokes and sense of humour. What is she referring to? Similarity to the Shoah, or something else?

> „then, and then, you see, some years later it was owing to the Hungarian steel industry based on mining that I travelled, or **started** to travel over half the world a few years later. Life is such."

This would be the joking and humorous life? That first she works on the creation of the centre of the Hungarian steel industry and later travels over half the world owing to the steel industry? She talks at length about her trips, how she saved money earned from other jobs to supplement the meagre daily fee abroad in order to maximally enjoy life as a sales agent in the far East, where the average Hungarian could not go in those times. She turns back to the tragedy before fifty six only several minutes later.

> „Needless to say,=you see, that in fifty six I did not join the party again, because I knew exactly what this party was. And after all finally, socialism did not corrupt me so much, and I thought I don't have to pretend, I will get by somehow. So that I **don't** have to be a party member since I do not agree with the party. Which- which eventually (after all) was a painful process on my part, you see, because it meant total disillusionment. And then eventually I landed this sales agency job."

She ends her story about breaking with the party, in which we can feel the dignity of the upper middle-class girl who would not pretend for petty favours if not necessary. At the same time she makes us suspect that there is another story in the background that shook her so much, in

addition to hard physical work and disillusionment, that she cannot and does not want to talk about.

> „- You mentioned that as early a sin fifty three-
>
> - Yes, sure. Yes. So now this was the one side of that thing, the other side, unskilled worker, there, I went to that higher seminary; I was put out of my flat, I was fired from my job; and I had to ask myself the question: »Good Lord, now what is this? Now what is this? What did my husband do? Why is he in prison? «"

Magda's account of the events and her state of mind suggests that she felt very insecure and frightened. What should she think? Is the party right to imprison her husband? And most likely she was not allowed to talk to her husband as people carried off to prison by ÁVH were not entitled to receiving visitors. And even if he had been entitled it could not have been any real conversation because of the severe control. But she knew her husband as an honest man. What is the truth? At that time, the practice of show trials were not a fact yet and Magda did not know what she knows today and explained us at length, i.e. how the party looked for enemies within itself when it ran out of enemies outside.

> „»And what did I do? « Me, I knew about myself exactly that I sure had not done anything apart from being stupidly zealous. You see, and I wanted=to do=good=all the time be-cause=I=wanted= to save=the= world. It must have occurred to me to ask myself whether my husband really did something?"

She goes on explaining her uncertainty. If she is sure that she did not do anything wrong, can she be sure about her husband?

> „And I had to ask-, first my idea was that if the party, all in capital letters, simply makes a cadre disappear, imprison him, and that person happens to= be= my =husband, but I, as a zealous communist I should know that **he must have done** something **awful**! That's why the party, all in capital letters, had to imprison him! Eradicate him! Because he betrayed it! **The Party**!"

Magda seems to believe what her party tells her. Her husband betrayed the party. Otherwise he would not have been thrown in jail.

> „But I had to realise, what did I do? You see? And if they will do this to **me** and I did not do anything punishable in the world, then he must have, did my husband do anything punish-able at all?"

But, she recalls, when she herself was put out of job and flat she got suspicious.

> „And if he did not do-, if he did:, it's his business, why am I punished? And if he did not do anything, why are he and me both punished? Why?"

She slowly realises that if she is punished unjustly, maybe her husband is, too. Which means that there is something wrong with The Party. Even if it is right to punish the husband, it also punished Magda, the woman belonging to the husband, who certainly has not done anything against The Party. How does Magda feel about it? She herself was unjust to believe her hus-band guilty. May this be the story she cannot tell us? That her husband was imprisoned as part of a show trial and that there was a time when she believed that The Party was right? And may this be the reason why she does not go on narrating in detail her personal story but goes back to her not re-joining the party. Is she ashamed of trusting The Party more than her husband?

> „Soby the time Stalin died I perfectly knew, I had personal experience of what the **practical** implementation of **Stalinism**-Leninism was. You see? Then I had no illusion >whatsoever any more. Because then I already kn- knew what reality was<. And **this was exactly why**,

> when **fifty six*** came, I did not re-join the party. I thought I would not go on with the show, no matter what.* Yes."

Yes, Magda has the guts not to re-join the party. But what happened to the marriage? What happened between the two of them, one having believed that the other was guilty, but it was only her party that was guilty? She punished the party by not re-joining it, but was that enough, could that have been enough for the husband to restore trust? Or the imprisoned husband never knew about this crisis of trust? When understanding that it was the party which was wrong, could Magda pretend as if nothing had happened?

We do not know when they got divorced exactly, only that sometime in the fifties. Maybe the divorce was the consequence of this story? That the husband did not forgive what could not have been forgiven? That Magda believed those who accused him? This becomes increasingly our impression.

And how does Magda live with this burden after 1956? Ending her story after telling us how she got disillusioned with the party, she starts speaking about her job as a company sales agent.

> „And after all finally, socialism did not corrupt me so much, and I thought I don't have to pretend, I will get by somehow. So that I **don't** have to be a party member since I do not agree with the party. Which eventually (after all) was a painful process on my part, you see, because it meant total disillusionment.", we heard that already.

And then I got this foreign trade job. Which which in which, in which I did all sorts of tricks so that with that small things could be done differently than it was supposed to be done by by: the dull masses, I got myself that little something, you know?

After relating in detail how she did the clandestine trading, she says that

> „now, you had to speak foreign languages, you could not do this via an interpreter",

proudly that she, who had been deprived of so much in life, had that skill.

> „on the other hand, the Hungarian ministry of foreign trade always delegated the stupidest persons as representation heads, who gave always the lowest daily fee, so the bosses never travelled there. The daily fee was so meagre /hah hah ((laughs)) that you could not afford a roll of film on your daily fee. But there was this wonderful far East. So I saved money elsewhere so that I could afford a living there, you know, I found out this world for myself. And there I was selling this good Hungarian equipment, and I demanded and **was given** a hired driver and a rented car and had myself driven out in the desert, well=there=you=can't drive there on your own, you see. And I made some very good business. There I managed a little to get that little difference, you know, that the-. Yes."

„That little difference." What can she be thinking about? A little difference that makes her feel good? Or that makes her different from the average? That makes her the daughter of the proud upper middle-class mother, who could obtain anything she wanted before her world wrecked:

> „My mother got it in her head that er that, it was this very fashionable table cloth at that time, I do not remember it's name. One day my mother thought it up, and presented her idea to my father, that we needed it for big family gatherings, when all the relatives from Transylvania came, and my father judged that it was not exactly an expenditure that necessarily has to be made. My mother did not say a word. But she looked up in this journal, something like Burda, and went to Vienna, bought the base- and whatever. And my mother sat at it and I don't know, in a year and a half, or I don't= know=in=what=time she did it.*Yes. Because she wanted it badly, my father did not want to pay for it, and the will of both of them was fulfilled, finally./My father didn't have to pay for it ((giggling)), my mother did it."

From several points of view, Magda's story is specific for her generation. Those few still available, were young when liberated and found no one else than the Communist Party to trust. Their identities and values were not solid enough to guide them at the time of the change between the two totalitarian systems. Thus, as described in the Freudian mass psychology, the Communist Party became the replacement of their mothers and fathers, their only support.

Nevertheless, the second tragedy in Magda's life was caused by this trust. It cost her her marriage. And after that, in the softening regime, she felt capable to create only one single modus vivendi of getting by and profit from her education.

Magda has been carrying her burden, a personal tragedy probably typical for the era, for sixty years. And she cannot, does not dare to and does not want to talk about it. She does not want to tell the-untold, the un-tellable, which, however, was a coded message in her narration.

Then – luckily in this case – by mistake in the organisation of the research, Magda was interviewed by a second interviewer a month or two later. Maybe not realising that it is the same research, she agrees to the second interview.

And she tells the same story almost word by word. Except that this time she is able to tell about her husband:

> „You said you married, could you tell about this?
>
> -Yes.- My first marriage- it was a- desperate flight because- I was drifting in the world alone, I had no-one. And it was a life saver- for me my first marriage- and I had—a-wonderful and very honest husband, whose tragedy was that—honestly fell in love with Marxism. I went through this process too. This thing had different consequences for the two of us. One day he woke up to find himself arrested by AVH. So a show trial – And – by that time I was so much **infected** with this Marxist theory that I first thought,- when he was arrested, that he must have done something because the party all=in=capital=letters would not imprison someome who is innocent."

And then tells almost word by word the same story about Komló and her disillusionment, Stalin's death, as on the previous occasion. This time she does not forbid the theme of her marriages, so we ask about her second husband, and get the horrible answer:

> „My first marriage eventually broke up, and it broke up at the point that th ---- my husband- simply could not understand how I could have believed that he had done anything bad, and he is perfectly right, or was right, he is dead now, the poor man."

It seems that Magda agrees with our interpretation, and this time she tells what she could not tell the last time. Is it possible that the first interview – in which we could only decode a coded message – launched off a quasi therapy process that enabled Magda to tell the untellable – even though only very carefully and timidly? Is her case suggesting that the narrative interview technique, this special way of asking questions, has a double advantage? It not only allows the

analyst to unravel what is not manifestly told, what the interviewee cannot let to surface in the interview, or at all, but also the interview itself, letting the interviewee to tell his/her story freely has a therapeutic effect.

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Narrative Analysis and Fantasy in Life

Brian Roberts
University of Glamorgan, Wales, UK

Abstract

Narrative analysis should give attention to how individuals routinely engage in 'fantasy' as part of narration. Fantasy in life is more than just an involvement in 'fancy' or the 'fanciful' – it is central to our daily life experiences through 'imagination'. Involved here are the connections between life's elements and feelings, including the construction of 'fantasy lives': – What could have been? What might be now? What could be later? Fantasy in life is important because 'real lives' are in part fantasy and 'fantasy lives' are in part real. In short, narrative analysis needs to pursue further the notion of fantasy – as related to imagination, phantasmagoria, time, and memory – in the simultaneous 'composition' and 'performance' of life.

Key Terms: Composition, Fantasy, Imagination, Memory, Narrative, Performance, Phantasmagoria, Time[8].

[8] 'Fantasy' and 'Phantasy' are used interchangeably here – as reflective mental image-making and expression containing rather more than whimsicality or fancifulness. The article is not dealing with the important subject of 'desire' (or the 'erotic', or the problematisation of the body and its sexuality, see Hutcheon, 1989, ch. 6). There is an enormous psychoanalytic, feminist and postmodern literature on desire (which is too extensive to review here), in any case, in this article 'fantasy' is seen as wider imaginative mental process, of which 'desire' may be seen as a part.

1. Introduction - the importance of 'Fantasy' in life construction.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to define narrative analysis e.g. Riessman (2005) identifies thematic, structural, interactional and performative types (see also Roberts, 2002) – perhaps one reason for increasing discussion about its 'future' (see Narrative Inquiry, 2006, 16:1; Qualitative Inquiry, 2007, 13:4). Narrative approaches differ greatly in assumptions on the self or identity – very simply, some tend towards case typologies or language form (thematic and structural), others conversational relations between speakers (interactional) or the dramaturgical (performative) (see Riessman, 2005; Brockmeier and Carbaugh, 2001). A further complication is that the 'narrative interview' has also been used with other methods (e.g. ethnography, action research), while analysis has drawn on many methodological and theoretical influences (e.g. grounded theory, interactionism, gestalt, grounded theory, hermeneutics, phenomenology and psychoanalytic theory). Various 'biographic-narrative' approaches have emerged (see, Andrews et al. eds. 2000; Chamberlayne et al. eds. 2000; Hollway and Jefferson 2000; Wengraf, 2001) and can be seen, in part, as an attempt to overcome some deficiencies regarding self/identity in some narrative analyses. Here, in this article, the intention is not to review these developments, but rather, call for more attention to the place of 'imagination' in narration while regarding 'narration' of life as 'performative' – as being expressed/represented orally, visually, in fact, through the range of communication by the senses.

This 'exploratory' article emphasises the imaginative and openness of 'life composition' in the construction of understandings of the experiences and sense of selves of individuals. 'Fantasy' in life refers not only to the commonly recognised processes of imagination and reinterpretation through which we perceive our experiences. It also refers to alternative lives: the 'might have beens', 'possible lives', 'realities as if' in 'fantasy time' – the parallel interweaving individual pasts, presents and futures (see Brockmeier, 2002: 462; Husserl in Schutz, 1971: 238). Narrative analysis, while certainly not unaware of the role of 'imagination' and 'performative composition' (Riessman, 205) should consider more radically how we 'imaginatively' and actively 'perform' in 'composing' our lives - 'factualise-fictionalise', 'visualise' and sense, emotionally feel, and 'time' - our experiences. As Riessman states:

> Narratives do not mirror, they refract the past…The 'truths' of narrative accounts are not in their faithful representations of a past world, but in the shifting connections they forge among past, present and future. They offer storytellers a way to re-imagine their lives… (Riessman, 2005: 6)

The notions of 'fantasy' and 'fantasy lives' support the view that we move between multiple presents, pasts and futures or 'temporal homes' (see Chowers, 2002). In this movement the difference between 'real time' or 'real lives' and their 'fantasy' equivalents is blurred: we live in fantasy time while simultaneously fantasy time is an essential part of action in life. Here, there is an implicit correction to the often simple, underlying model of time used to analyse individual 'tellings' as a single chronological narrative - with a linear story/or plot ensuring life's coherence and continuity. Instead, a life narrative can be viewed as ongoing performative attempt at composition – in imaginatively trying to provide a continuity, coherence, and comprehension in life. This endeavour is always compromised by the 'what ifs' in life – the possibilities that things could have been, or even were, different according to subsequent reflection(s). The lesson of this view is that narrative 'analyzsers' must be careful not to impose a singular narrative model of life – a view that can underplay discontinuities and complexities in individual and social recol-

lection. This can lose an awareness that events are often 'chronologically imprecise', 'telescoped', distorted or forgotten according to individual and popular 'memory' (Davies, 1995: 338). Even so, in our own tellings and in our interpretations of the narratives of others we expect coherence, continuity and certainty. Unfortunately, as Craib says, in this endeavour we assume that 'narratives are good for us, that they help us get our lives together, make sense of where we are and enable us to go forward' (Craib, 2003: 1). He argues, that social scientists may be more willing to accept certain stories, and psychotherapists and others may offer narratives that 'keep people in passive positions, inhibit possible change and separate people from the authenticity of their lives'. Like Craib, we should prefer a conception that starts with people's ability to articulate their experience:

> This might require a number of different, perhaps contradictory narratives, each of which will have gaps, fault lines of various descriptions, ambiguous beginnings and possibilities of any number of conclusions. (Craib, 2003: 10)

The recognition of fantasy in life accepts the notion that in narration there are differing life/time dimensions or planes, which intersect. We can perceive ourselves not only in linear, chronological terms but also in various other 'time perspectives' moving between differing 'lives' or 'selves' (see Roberts, 2004; Schutz, 1971: 214; Cohen and Taylor, 1976: 69-93)[9]. As Schutz argued, there are many 'finite provinces of meaning' through which consciousness and meaningful experiences flow (Zeitlin, 1973: 174). There are 'multiple realities' in which we cast our thoughts backwards and forwards in linear, circular, spiral and other movements in time (see Brockmeier, 2002).

The conscious movements between a multiple realities involve the use of 'imagination' and its facility of 'fantasy'. The use of 'fantasy' or 'fantasising' is a routine part of human living. It is not the mere preserve of some separate consciousness, a zone of 'unreality'; we do not simply move in thought from an assumed (singular) pragmatic 'reality' to the non-worldly 'fantastical' ('flights of fancy', daydreaming, or 'acting out' in play). Rather, it is only through 'fantasy', after all, that there is the freedom of discretion to anticipate our routine actions by imagining the self in new roles and circumstances (Zeitlin, 1973: 174). Even in 'mere' daily play, jokes and daydreams a valuable aspect of consciousness is at work in the exploration of the absurd, the caricature, the mysterious and so on in gaining new perspectives on current 'reality'. Admittedly, in the 'fantasies' of night dreams the perception of time and individual's conscious 'control' of the flow of meaning is absent (Schutz, 1971: 215-6). But, in the fantasy of daydreaming, for instance, there is an 'ordinary', 'practical' function'. Fantasy can be seen as a necessary part of the productive formation of meaning in consciousness; it is involved in the visualising, emotional exploration, and anticipating and reviewing of motivation, action and the certainties of life experience.

2. Imagination

Fantasy is a process of thought that moves between the 'as' and 'as if' in life. It is part of the more basic, creative imaginative faculty associated with a sense of self and being human. But,

[9] Unfortunately, Cohen and Taylor (1976) tend to see fantasy as limited to 'escapes' or 'alternatives' to some mundane or 'paramount reality' rather than as a more 'dynamic' constituent in thought and action (whether 'ordinary' or 'extraordinary').

there are clearly bodily and other limitations to self-creation[10]. For example, as Schutz points out: 'In my phantasms I may even vary my bodily appearance, but this freedom of discretion has its barrier at the primordial experiences of the boundaries of my body. (Schutz, 1971: 239).

Due to the capacities of 'imagination' a simple 'fact-fiction' or 'real-unreal' division is not adequate in understanding an individual life[11]. Instead, it is prudent to conceive a multiplicity of individual meanings as running parallel and interweaving within 'time perspectives' (Schutz, 1971, p. 214) as part of the imaginative work of a reflexive auto/biographical self. Thus, as White asks: 'How else can any past, which by definition comprises events, processes, structures, and so forth, considered to be no longer perceivable, be represented in either consciousness or discourse except in an "imaginary" way'? (White, 1987: 57). Similarly, Ricoeur in describing hermeneutical interpretation concludes that 'does not this discipline of the real, this ascesis of the necessary lack the grace of imagination, the upsurge of the possible'? (Ricouer, 1976: 203).

The argument here is that the 'imagination' (c.f. Mills, 1970; Morgan, 1998), alongside timing, must be given its rightful central place within the analysis of narration by individuals (see Dewsbury, 2002)[12]. However, the exercise of imagination and timing is not merely 'cognitive' – a planned, rational procedure – emotions also arise. Here, a traditional separation in the conception and study of individuals must be challenged: the distinction between emotional and the cognitive aspects of life. One such challenge was made, for instance, by Marcuse who sought to overcome this distinction by transforming Freud's the pleasure principle into a revolutionary mode by overcoming the historic separation of fantasy from the cognitive, and by giving a 'liberating orientation on the future' (O'Neill, 2001: 121, 118). Benjamin's work is also very relevant at this point: while attracted to Surrealism's disruption of linear notions of time and the use of the dream experience he seeks to replace its 'mystical' or 'utopian' visions of the future with more concrete (revolutionary) potential (Calderbank 2003). In short, the Enlightenment split between emotion and rationality (see Porter, 2000; Roberts, 2006: 139-42) requires re-examination to restore the intimate interrelation between individual feeling and planning. The view here is that imagination – as implicating fantasy, time and emotion - should be given its proper role: as at one and the same time an everyday faculty used for guiding/emotionally experiencing routine action while also perceiving alternatives, including those potentially liberating.

3. Phantasmagoria and Time

'Phantasmagoria' or the 'phantasmagorical' is usually taken to refer to an illusion or shifting notion of real or imaginary entities – as a movement between the 'real' and 'unreal'. It is also

[10] Often the 'imagination' and 'fancy' have been seen as the same 'imaginative faculty' rather than imagination as the more fundamental (see Newcomb, 1989: 192-3).

[11] It should be noted that readership expectations (and presumably the narrative analyst's) of fact and fiction in individual life writing varies historically (Colley, 2002: 92).

[12] The term 'imagination' is used here if a rather more broadly and loosely than the notion of the 'imaginary' found in Lacan and Barthes (see Anderson, 2001: 72-3, 137). Interestingly, on an historical plane in linking imagination-vision-feeling, Jennings spoke of 'The means of vision' whereby 'matter (sense impressions) [are] transformed and reborn by Imagination: turned into an image' and through which ' 'the emotional side of nature'… is kept alive and satisfied and fed' (Jennings, 1985: xxxviii; c.f. Williams' famous 'structure of feeling', Williams, 1961).

commonly associated with the chimeral and sometimes (again) the 'fanciful'. For our purposes, the effect of 'phantasmogoria' in fantasy is to perceive ordinary daily events or experiences, and those of more lasting significance in a life, as unfamiliar and even strange. It is to see experience - in present, past and future - in another way, as if by some means (e.g. choice or fate) there had been an alternative situation or direction. In this way, 'past' events become 'as if' once more brought into the 'now', as reconstituted and subject to a (possible) different outcome. Phantasmagoria operates as part of fantasy in life: it renders previous experiencing anew, brings the past into the present, and so introduces 'fantasy in life', and even 'life in fantasy'.

The term 'phantasmagoria' appears as an important concept for a number of major writers[13]. Immediately relevant here for the discussion of fantasy, imagination and time in the study of lives is Schutz's observation (following Husserl) that phantasies can 'eliminate all the features of standard time except its irreversibility'. We continue to grow old even if we imaginatively 'retard' or 'accelerate' time to reshape the events and understandings of the past (Schutz, 1971: 239). Also appropriate for understanding fantasy in life is his comment that 'Every projection of action is rather a phantasying of action…but not the activity itself…It is an intuitive advance picturing which may or may not include belief…' (Schutz, 1972: 59). Thus, within the constraints of embodiment, we 'fantasise' or 'rehearse' our past and future actions and, thereby, our life in multiple ways: we experience again, sometimes afresh, often only to confirm 'what happened'.

Fantasy lives should not be conceived as a full attempt to live 'in another world' in an unknown time dimension – a forlorn attempt to live a completely parallel life unattached to the embodied, material and temporal reality of living. Certainly, at one extreme of the imagination, although not completely 'otherworldly, there is the 'fantastic' or fanciful' or, perhaps, more 'artistic' workings of imagination. But, also to be recognised is the 'thinking through' of daily experiences, hopes and expectations as more mundane possibilities - the 'fantasies of mediocrity' (Barthes in Sontag, 1983: 408). More broadly, is the problem of our understanding of 'reality' itself, as Barthes argues: 'The fact that we cannot manage to achieve more than an unstable grasp of reality doubtless gives the measure of our present alienation…' (Barthes, 1973: 159).

In summary, in the life narrative, the exercise of 'fantasy' is more than mere free floating 'emotion' or 'flight of fancy', instead it includes an entwining of the emotional and cognitive as life is envisioned, sensed and lived. The phantasmagorical or the shifting perceptions between the strange and familiar and the real and unreal, is a key dimension of this cognitive-emotional self-construction. We explore not merely our actions but our sense of self, or rather selves, imaginatively in the past, present and future – what we were, are and could be. It is not a peripheral aspect of 'being' but essential for self-hood and action as part of our 'internal conversation' – the reflection on ourselves, current projects and social relations (Archer, 2003).

[13] For example, in Marx, Freud, Marcuse and Laing, see Rose, 1978: 31, 41-2,47; Marcuse, 1969: 119; Laing, 1967, Laing and Cooper, 1971: 25; Rickman, ed. 1937). Also of interest here is Surrealist and Situationist writing on temporality and reality (see Russell, 2002; Sim, 1998: 361-2). In this article phantasmagoria it is used rather loosely to indicate the facility to reflect, re-interpret and re-imagine events, experiences and possible life alternatives by rendering the familiar 'strange'.

4. Memory

Despite the widespread recognition in narrative analysis that time is narrativised and narratives are timed (c.f. Ricoeur, 1981, 1984, 1985, 1988), the associated and important issue of the nature and operation of memory still requires more attention (see Roberts, 2002: 134-50). Memory is inextricably related to our 'humanness – and the 'human transcendence of time' relating to 'transience' and 'finity':

> All human action… is embedded in a continuity of past, present, and future, extends into the past and future; and constitutes those horizons whilst binding them in the present (Adam, 1990: 127; see also Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 488-9).

Memory is employed within the imagination in the daily construction of action in our lives. It is also crucially implicated in the formation of 'our own personal reconstruction of the past' since it is 'the first essential stepping-stone' in connecting us, via relatives, friends and neighbours, to the traditions of our society' (Toulmin and Goodfield, 1967; 25). Mead, for instance, stresses the importance of the way in which 'memories' are 'placed' in the ongoing construction of experience:

> We frequently have memories that we cannot date, that we cannot place… We remember perfectly distinctly the picture, but we do not have it definitely placed, and until we can place it in terms of our past experience we are not satisfied. (Thompson and Tunstall, 1971: 144; see Petras, 1968: 12-13; Maines et al. 1983: 164)

Mead, crucially, connects 'memory imagery' to a 'fitting in' - an inclusion or exclusion of elements into a framework of experience. He says that the 'assurances which we give to a remembered occurrence come from the structures with which they accord'. (Mead, 1929: 237; Mead, 1956: 335; see also Flaherty and Fine, 2001). As Hunter says, 'recall is often less a matter of literal reproduction than of the imaginative construction of fragmentary recall into a coherent whole' - although we can argue it is an 'attempt' at coherence (Hunter, 1964: 183). Imaginative construction through memory relates our past, present and future selves and relations. As Dilthey, argues:

> …in life alone does the present encompass the representation of the past in memory and of the future both in phantasy that pursues its potentialities and in activity that sets itself goals within these potentialities. Thus the present is filled with pasts and bears the future within itself. (Dilthey in Habermas, 1972: 154-5)

While commonly, as in Mead, memory has been seen as using 'images' in the framing experience, if this simply means memory as a set of pictures it is clearly a limited conception. Any image has referents from its experiential context and other senses (e.g. a remembered image of a person may bring the sound of their voice). Past experiences are not merely visualised but also re-experienced by being 're-heard', 're-smelled', 're-touched' and 're-felt', etc. As with a recalled image, a remembered piece of music, or a taste, or an odour may bring a range of associations and feelings. In fact, some of our most powerful and important 'memories' may initially arise from dimensions other than the immediately visual - and all memories, in whatever form, are 'evocative' (Driessen, 1998: 8).

While, memory is obviously connected to the construction of the 'past', we also have rehearsed future action - we can anticipate the likely success or failure of different projects. In addition, we also have a retrospective rehearsal – 'What if I had done this or that' – 'What would have been the outcome?' (Schutz, 1972: 103). As Mead says, we hold (in the present) multiple fu-

tures and multiple pasts: 'our pasts are always mental in the same manner in which the futures that lie in our imaginations ahead of us are mental' (Flaherty and Fine, 2001: 152). Thus, in memory we remember, we recall and structure. not only the 'whats' and 'whys' but also the 'what ifs', 'if onlys' of experience – and we can add here that these memories are also 'sensual' associations. Fantasy in memory should not be sidelined - as arising in occasional trivial remembrance or seen as an idle speculation on what may happen. It is implicated in the construction of our notions of past, present and future and, therefore, our sense of life. As Laing and Cooper argue, it is 'a mode of experience' which is 'essential part of the meaning or sense…implicit in action' (Laing and Cooper, 1971: 2-3).

5. The Composition and Performance of Life

The practice of narrative study has been primarily based on obtaining the personal life story through a requested oral narration (an interview) that is later transcribed and produced into written form for analysis. As is commonly recognised, this is a limited mode for gaining individual life expression and representation for interpretation. Narrative analysis has always been aware that 'life' cannot be simply or completely caught by oral-written texts. But, now there are increasing attempts to provide a more 'complete' conception of the individual as a sensual, dramatic, embodied human being through various modes of representation and expression. There is a rising interest in other (often already existing) materials of life expression such as autobiographies, diaries, letters, photographs and other personal documents (c.f. Biography, and Auto/Biography journals) that have been more peripheral to the concerns of narrative analysis. In addition, the emergence and growing influence of 'performance studies' (see Bial ed. 2004; Denzin, 2003; Schechner, 2006) has added another challenge to narrative analysis by again extending consideration of how life 'composition' takes place and may be understood (see Summerfield, 2004; Sheridan et al. 2000). So, written forms, such as poetry, and also the wider arts of drama, painting alongside new media and multi-media arts are receiving major consideration as sites for biographical expression and interpretation (see Bochner and Ellis, 2003). These broader arenas of imaginative composition, opened up by these developments, provide new opportunities for narrative analysis beyond the limitations of the transcribed interview text. There are multiple ways in which the person expresses his or her 'individuality' **-** as a fully active, feeling and sensual being. This embodied, sensual – performative - subject should be conceived as comprehending and expressing life experiences and self through verbal, visual and other senses (touch, smell, sound) (see Finnegan, 2002; Howes ed. 2005). In this broader compass the narration of life breaks through the structural constraints or assumptions of the 'story form' (as remaining in much narrative analysis) with radical consequences: the linear, chronological narrative is only one of many possibilities of life expression brought by the 'montage' of images, verbal connection and disruption, feelings and senses we experience. We can be said to 'perform' our lives through our sensual, aesthetic and artistic capabilities; we imaginatively comprehend our lives as auto/biographic composers in trying, always without complete success, to gain 'composure' and compose a self (or our-selves) (Summerfield, 1998: 16-17).

In composing our narrative(s) we have to make imaginative linkages between the events and experiences that life brings. These life connections can include:- coincidence, chance, contingency, deja-vu, fate, fortune, pre-ordination, repetition, serendipity, and number of other means, alongside simile, metaphor and metonymy, in attempting to piece together the myriad

elements of recollection and projection. The use of these connections need not be consistent in a given individual narrative. But, as we recall, we interpret and re-interpret (re-view, re-feel, re-touch, re-hear, etc.) experience in a retrospective attempt to give meaning to what has happened or may occur – in a vain effort to give linearality and coherence. Other means are also used to shape this ongoing life-understanding. As has been widely remarked in narrative analysis and other life study, personal narratives are often composed by employing, in part, common 'myths' (e.g. 'the self made man', the 'hero', 'good mother') and written or pictorial forms (e.g. genres in literature and film) in the wider culture (see, for example, Peneff, 1990; Roberts, 2002: 56-60; Brockmeier, 2001; McAdams, 1993; Samuel and Thompson eds. 1990). As Bruner says, commenting on his own work:

> It soon became apparent not only that life imitated art but that it does so by choosing art's genres and its other devices of storytelling as its modes of expression. (Bruner, 1990: 120-1)

The wider culture can also provide exemplars or 'compositional forms' which can give a structuring summary to an individual narrative composition, for instance: Life as/as if Conversion, Revelation or Renewal (Riessman, 1993; Smith and Sparkes, 2002); Dream, Lyrical or Poetic (Esslin, 1968: 25); Farce or Absurd (Tomalin, 2003: 88; Rabelais, 1927: xviii; Esslin, 1968: 419); Irony (Hutcheon, 1989; Sim ed. 1998: 286-7); Melodrama or Mystery; Paradox, Plagiarism or Hero-worship; Parody or Pastiche; and Satire/Critique/Comedy[14]. To take one of these as a personal example: some years ago I wrote an article on my educational experiences – how they were connected appeared to be a mystery. On reflection it seems as if I was 'playing detective' in attempting linearlity ('a path') and establishing some coherence by assembling clues. I said:

> My schooling remains something of a mystery to me. By 'mystery' I mean that it is difficult for me to understand how the end point is connected to the start of my path from a working-class background to the world of the professional academic… The mystery of my schooling remains and probably always will. How was I able to make the boundary crossings? (Roberts, 998: 104, 113)

A narrative, therefore, while retaining its individual uniqueness, may draw upon various a performative compositional form(s) taken from wider culture to make sense of the complexities of life (and the lives of others)[15]. An individual may also move between such conceptions, giving seemingly contradictory versions, even within the same text or telling. Alternatively, the individual may rely extensively, and become relatively 'fixed', around a particular compositional form, repeating ritualistically its pattern. Here, the narrative can become close to a set 'archetype' or rigid 'personal myth' – as not simply an occasional source for some meaning construction but to come to dominate the composition. At another extreme, a tendency to fragmentation or deconstruction takes place where the individual is caught within a swirl of possible compositonal forms. These extremes show clearly that life compositions have a 'timing' - as 'stuck' in the past, or recurring, or a continuity, or still to be realised. This timing is often revealed by the

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[14] An interesting case study here is Dickens who likened his life to a 'dream'. Also, secrets, shadows, mysteries, and hallucinations or dreams figure prominently in his work (see Pykett, 2002; Smith, 2003). He can be said to have 'fictionalised' his life and 'factualised' his dreams (see Roberts, 2002, pp. 66-9; Newcomb, 1989).

[15] For wider issues regarding the relation between official, institutional models and individual 'narratives', see, Evans, 1999; Samuel and Thompson eds. 1990; Tonkin, 1990; Bourdieu, 1986; Goodson 1995; Fischer-Rosenthal, 2000). For the 'art of storytelling' itself in modern life, see Benjamin, 1976: 277.

individual's use of a particular metaphor to summarise life (e.g. as a journey, or divided by an 'epiphany' etc., see Denzin, 2001: 34-6; Sparkes and Smith, 2003). Compositional forms in imagining life are also closely associated with emotion or 'mood' and the senses. For example, in fantasising a 'what if' life of the past, a summarised life may become emotionally experienced through nostalgia or regret about what was, is and could be, perhaps closing down alternative meaning or disconnecting from ongoing experience and the possibilities for personal change. Alternatively, thoughts on 'what if' in life may bring a sense of relief that choice, fate, etc. had brought a different outcome.

Some continuing, 'creative' fantasising in life composition – a persistent attempt at coherence – appears to be vital for our sense of being and necessary to avoid the perils of obsession and degeneration in life composition:

> To make meaning in life is to create dynamic narratives that render sensible and coherent the seeming chaos of human existence. To fail in this effort of mythmaking is to experience the malaise and stagnation that come from insufficient narration of human life. (McAdams, 1993: 166; see Frank, 1984).

Narrative analysis should see life compositions as not merely 'accounts' but as performative compositions. The idea of an 'account' carries with it certain assumptions, e.g. 'accounting for' - adding up or summarising (the life or self), a retrospective timing and closure. 'Performance' gives perhaps a present orientation – life and self as currently performed in the 'now'. 'Performative composition' may be more useful in giving an idea of life as a 'continuous rehearsal'. This means not simply that life in general is to some extent a 'drama', as like a play in a theatre performed by actors (c.f. Goffman, 1971), but that life is itself dramatic, emotional, imaginative and 'fantastical' - even in the 'mundane' reality of the everyday. The idea of performative composition has the potential to conceive identity or self-formation beyond the limitations of the spoken or textual, producing a conception of a more rounded, 'emotional', meaning-creating, imaginative and 'embodied' individual'. Admittedly, there are some dangers in adopting the idea of 'performance'. Potentially all action may be viewed as merely 'performance' (see Burke, 2005); instead, a notion of the 'self in/as performance' must involve the interior self in which we imagine and compose ourselves and reflect on action and anticipate our 'performances'.

6. Conclusion

While fantasy has its more 'fantastical', some would say 'whimiscal' or inconsequential aspects, it also has an essential input into how we see our activities and lives. It is both part of the 'routine' anticipations, alternatives and reviews of what has happened, is happening, and can happen in daily action and the composition of selves (see Schutz, 1972: 59-60). The life connections (e.g. fate, coincidence, choice) we make between experiences, events, relationships and feelings to make sense of life events have 'fantasy' aspects. There are 'what ifs' in our consideration of past, present and future events and their associated emotions. Fantasy is also more intimately implicated in our self-narratives. The performative composition of our life narratives includes 'fantasy in life' and 'life in fantasy'; while certain experiences or an adopted persona may not have taken place or ever take place, nevertheless as imagined (to paraphrase W.I. Thomas) they can be 'real' in their outcomes. In short, as Brockmeier argues: 'Real or imagined, narrated or enacted, discovered in one's past or projected into one's future, our possible lives are a constitutive part of our selves'. Fundamentally, to 'live possible lives in possible

worlds is inherent to the human condition…it is impossible to assume that there is only one story, one true representation of a life'. (Brockmeier, 2002: 462).

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Please tell us if changes:

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Biography-and-Society@gmx.de

The deadline for the next newsletter is June 2008

President:

Gabriele Rosenthal
University of Göttingen
Methodenzentrum Sozialwissenschaften
Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3
37073 Goettingen, Germany
phone: ++49 551 39 12413
e-mail: g.rosenthal@gmx.de

Vice President:

Brian Roberts
Visiting Professor in Border Studies
Centre for Border Studies
Forest Hall
The University of Glamorgan
Pontypridd CF37 1DL
Wales, UK
phone: ++44 (0) 113 2669
e-mail: glentrob@btinternet.com

Secretary:

Michaela Koettig
University of Goettingen
Methodenzentrum Sozialwissenschaften
Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3
37073 Goettingen, Germany
phone: ++49 551 39 14206
e-mail: michaela.koettig@gmx.de

Board Members:

Ursula Apitzsch
J.W.Goethe University, FB Gesell-schaftswissenschaften
Robert Mayerstr. 5
60054 Frankfurt M, Germany
fax: ++49 69 79822539
e-mail: apitzsch@soz.uni-frankfurt.de

Thea Boldt
Obere Karspule 20
37073 Gottingen
Germany
e-mail: theaboldt123@aol.com

Roswitha Breckner
University of Wien, Fakultaet für Hu-man- und Sozialwissenschaften, Institut für Soziologie
Rooseveltplatz 2, A-1090 Wien, Austria
phone: ++43 1 4277 48217,
fax: ++43 1 4277 9481
e-mail: roswitha.breckner@univie.ac.at

Kathy Davis
Institute History and Culture
Muntstr. 2A 3512 EV Utrecht
The Netherlands
phone: ++31 30 2536445
fax: ++31 30 2538381
e-mail: kathy.davis@let.uu.nl

Matti Hyvärinen
Department of Sociology and Social Psychology
33014 University of Tampere/FIN
phone: ++358 40 8774045
e-mail: matti.k.hyvarinen@uta.fi

Lena Inowlocki
Department Health and Social Work
Frankfurt University Applied Science
Nibelungenplatz 15
60318 Frankfurt M, Germany
phone: ++49 69 556 740
fax: ++49 69 9552 4028
e-mail: inowlocki@soz.uni-frankfurt.de

Kaja Kazmierska
Institute of Sociology
University of Lodz
ul.Rewolucji 1905r. 41/43
90-214 Lodz, Poland
phone/fax: ++48 42 56 26 05
e-mail: kajakaz@krysia.uni.lodz.pl

Tazuko Kobayashi
Department of Sociology
Japan Women`s University
Tama, Kawasaki, Kanagawa,
214-8565, Japan
phone: ++81 44 952 6830
fax: ++81 44 952 6849
e-mail: kobaya@fc.jwu.ac.jp

Feiwel Kupferberg
Malmö University
20506 Malmö/Sweden
phone: ++46 40 6658079
e-mail: feiwel.kupferberg@lut.mah.se

Helma Lutz
J.W. Goethe University Frankfurt/M.
Department of Social Sciences (FB 03)
Robert-Mayer Str. 5
D - 60054 Frankfurt/M.
phone: ++49-69-79822053
e-mail: Lutz@soz.uni-frankfurt.de

Henning Salling Olesen
Graduate School in Life Long Learning, University of Roskilde
P.O.-Box 260
4000 Roskilde, Denmark
phone: ++45-46742672
fax: ++45-46743070
e-mail: hso@ruc.dk

Marilyn Porter
Department of Sociology Memorial University, St John`s Newfoundland
A1C2Z1, Canada
phone: ++709 739 7982
fax: ++709 739 0838
e-mail: mporter@mun.ca

Gerhard Riemann
Georg-Simon-Ohm-Hochschule, Nürnberg
home: Olgastr. 6
34119 Kassel, Germany
phone/fax: ++49 561 775239
e-mail: gerhard.riemann@ohm-hochschule.de

Victoria Semenova
Institute of Sociology
Russian Academy of Sciences
Ul. Krzhizhanovskogo 24/35 b. 5
218 Moscow, Russia
phone: ++7 095 1289189
fax: ++7 095 7190740
e-mail: victoria-sem@yandex.ru

Julia Vajda
ELTE University
Faculty of social sciences
Institute of Sociology
1117 Budapest, Pázmány
Péter sétány 1/a, Hungary
phone: ++36 1 336 14 52
e-mail: h13073vaj@ella.hu

Vasintha Veeran
Dept of Political Science and Sociology
National University of Ireland
Galway/Ireland
phone: ++9 353 91 492027
e-mail: vasintha.veeran@nuigalway.ie

Hee-Young Yi
Sungkonghoe University
Center for Culture and Information Studies
1-1 Hang-Dong Kuro-Ku
Seoul, Korea
phone: ++822 2610 4722
++082 10 2259 0310
e-mail: heeyoungyi@hotmail.com